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ABSTRACT 
This study discusses the performance and prospects of 
the Nigerian economy in the wake of the oil euphoria. It 
produces some empirical evidence for the rapid destruction 
of Nigerian agriculture in the past ten years or more and 
it demonstrates that the plight of the Nigerian economy in 
general and the rural sector in particular was in part a 
direct consequence of the increase in oil revenue which 
pushed up the exchange rate and made it unprofitable to 
grow crops for export. It concludes that unless a radical 
change in government policy is effected to revive the 
agricultural sector, Nigeria will experience a depletion 
of both her oil and her agricultural resources to the 
extent that the economy could eventually face a food 
crisis like those recently experienced in Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Mali or Chad, and without an industrial base. The study 
argues that contrary to the view commonly held in Nigeria, 
the benefits in the medium and long term of devaluing the 
Nigerian currency(naira) will greatly outweigh the costs 
which are likely to be only temporary. We use the term 
"Dutch disease", as it was in the Netherlands, that the 
phenomenon of the adverse effects on the rest of the 
economy of a rise in the exchange rate, brought about by 
the discovery of natural gas, was first observed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The oil price revolution of 1973 suddenly changed the 
balance of political and economic power and threw the 
limelight on the relatively small number of countries that 
had reserves of oil - many of them Third World countries. 
These countries suddenly saw themselves, and were seen by 
others as having found a short cut to the Golden Era. 
However, while this represented a great problem to oil 
importing countries of the west, the oil producing 
countries themselves welcomed the sudden rise in their 
material fortunes. 
Among the OPEC countries that welcomed this sudden 
change in their fortune was Nigeria. Between 1958, the 
year Nigeria first exported crude oil, and 1973 Nigeria 
earned over N5 bn from petroleum exports; but between 1974 
to 1982 she earned over N70 bn, making a total of more than 
N75 bn. since oil first started to be exported. The 
thesis examines whether or not Nigeria made the most of 
the opportunities presented by the fact that Nigeria was 
one of the few sub-saharan African countries which had 
oil. Shakespeare's Julius Caesar provides an apt 
quotation to set the scene: - 
1 
"There is a tide in the affairs of men, which 
taken at the flood, leads onto fortune; 
omitted, all the voyage of their life is 
bound in shallows and in miseries. on 
such a full sea are we now afloatf and we 
must take the current when it services, or 
lose our ventures. " 
SHAKESPEARE; JULIUS CAESAR 
As the oil revenue started to flow it should have 
immediately started to raise the standard of life for 
Nigerians. Unfortunately, successive governments pursued 
policies which have reduced the beneficial impact which 
oil should have had on the economy and society of Nigeria 
and which have had undesirable consequences for the 
longterm development of her political economy. The most 
direct and destructive result of this impact [although by 
no means the only one] has been its devastating effect for 
the agricultural sector. 
Prior to the advent of oil in Nigeria, life was mainly 
rural and agriculture was the dominant economic activity. 
About 70-80 per cent of the population lived in the rural 
areas and were engaged in one kind of agricultural 
activity or another. Though relatively poor by today's 
standards, the populace had both cheap and plenty of food. 
In 1960, the country's GDP, valued at 1977 constant 
prices, amounted to N11369.5 million, the equivalent of 
N220 (U. S $341.5) per head. Of this total, agriculture 
accounted for 56 per cent while Transport and 
Communication, the second largest sector contributed about 
5 per cent. Mining, including Petroleum, contributed 4 
2 
per cent. Construction accounted for 3 per cent while 
manufacturing accounted for 2 per cent. Agriculture 
therefore was the largest single activity. It also made a 
significant contribution to exports. Until the late 
sixties and early seventies agricultural produce accounted 
for about 80 per cent of the total volume of exports. In 
1965 for example, groundnuts exports was 986 thousand 
metric tons, palm oil was 600 thousand metric tons, palm 
kernel was 416 thousand metric tons, etc. From the 1970's, 
oil started to play an ever more important role in 
exports, though agricultural exports continued to 
increase. But from 1973 onwards the volume of 
agricultural exports started to decline in absolute terms. 
By the mid 170's most agricultural produce like palm oil, 
cotton, groundnuts, etc, had virtually disappeared from 
the export scene(see Table 6.6). Some of them now 
represent significant import items as Table 6.3 shows. 
Agricultural exports had been completely displaced from 
the pre-eminent scene they had occupied at the time of 
Independence. While the growth in population and the 
recent drought in the northern parts of Nigeria may partly 
be blamed for this disappearance, the foundamental reason 
(and by far the most important in our view) is the effects 
petroleum, and the use made of it, has had on the 
production of these commodities. 
It all started in 1956 when Shell-BP discovered oil at 
Oloibiri and Afam in the Eastern part of Nigeria. It was 
3 
then thought by most experts that Nigeria had at last 
found a huge resource with which to initiate industrial 
expansion, and to provide additional resources to 
agriculture which had been the corner stone of the 
economy. It was also thought that petroleum would 
transform the Nigerian balance sheet and her entire 
economy, and hence provide a short cut to economic 
development. Within a few years of the discovery, oil 
revenues started to flow in and the consequences of 
increased earning from oil are what this thesis sets out 
to explore. 
In our view, what happened resulted from a combination 
0 
of economic and non-economic factors. The economic factors 
relate to inappropriate economic policies and planning, 
while the non-economic factors have more to do with 
mismanagement of public funds. ' 
On the economic front, the petroleum export sector led 
to the creation of a dual economy by giving rise to a new 
enclave which was only loosely tied into the rest of the 
economy but exerted a very undesirable influence as we 
shall argue. The expansion of Nigeria's petroleum exports, 
as we shall see, squeezed other parts of the economy. It 
1. Ihis study, however, paid particular attention to the Dutcl 
disease syndrome created by increased oil revenue. 
4 
produced a negative impact on the domestic 11 terms of 
trade 11 favouring petroleum and squeezing agriculture. 
The oil sector generated an exchange rate drift upwards 
that culminated in a fatal drop in the competitiveness of 
exports and of import- competing industries. It also 
brought about a regional imbalance created by large 
migrations to the new oil towns or centres. Employment 
increased in protected industries such as construction, 
internal trade and other private services, and decreased 
in export industries such as metals, and pulp and paper 
and in import- competing industries such as textile and 
clothing. Consumption of domestically produced goods 
declined, so did agricultural employment and output. The 
rise in the exchange rate caused Nigeria to become an ever 
larger importer of food in which previously she had been 
largely self-sufficient, and it also led to a large 
increase in imports of industrial goods, thus compounding 
the negative aspects of the scenario. Nigeria became the " 
Mecca of the salesmen of the industrial world 112 . Rice 
imports rose dramatically from 35 thousand metric tons in 
1970 to 7 million metric tons in 1975 and 313 million 
metric tons in 1983. So did wheat, maize and vegetable oil 
(See Table 6.3). The dependence of Nigeria on externally 
2. Stevens, C. (1982)Nigeria: Economic Prospects to 1985; After t 
oil glut, Econoric Intellegence Unit(EIU) Special Reports No. 
5 
produced staples grew markedly after 1972. As Nigerian 
agriculture stagnated, so previous self-sufficiency gave 
way to ever increasing imports of food and the payment for 
imported food was less of a problem, at least for a time 
because of increased oil revenue and the highly valued 
currency it engendered. The high valued naira was 
consumer- biased as it became apparently cheaper to import 
food than to grow it. In any case, cheap imports depressed 
local food production, and the low prices offered by the 
marketing Boards had all but quashed export commodity 
production. With too much of imports and almost a single 
export item, petroleum, Nigeria started to develop a 
current account balance of payments deficit in 1982. As 
imports continued unabated, Nigeria incurred more and 
more foreign debt. In order to remedy the current account 
deficit, import controls were instituted which 
precipitated a black market economy. The theme of this 
study is the squeeze on the tradeable sector (other 
exports apart from oil)of the Nigerian economy since the 
early 1970s brought about by the combination of nominal 
appreciation of naira and continuous neglect of the rural 
sector. We call this the "Dutch disease" syndrome. our aim 
therefore is to provide a theoretical and empirical 
framework for analysing this type of phenomenon. The name 
11 Dutch disease" was derived from the rapidly growing 
natural gas sector of the Netherlands economy and 
the 
damage it inflicted on the entire structure of the 
econoiny. The Netherlands is sinall and densely populated, 
6 
and one of the most highly developed countries in the 
world. She also depends very much on foreign trade and has 
one of the highest living standards in Europe. In the late 
1950s, the Netherland discovered a very large natural gas 
in north of the country and started rapid development of 
the resource in 1963. Since then some new finds have been 
made both onshore and offshore. By the 1970s, what was 
originally a natural gas importing country, started to 
export gas and by 1976, which represented a peak year for 
natural gas exports, she exported about 51 billion cubic 
metres or about 44 million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(mtoe). In addition, massive long-term export contracts 
were drawn up, with prices linked to the oil price. The 
balance of payments current account benefited accordingly. 
Apart from natural gas earning foreign exchange to the 
Netherlands as a result of increased exports, it also made 
a lot of contributions to the national budget. (see 
Table 1- 1) - 
But the euphoria started to wane in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. The balance of payments surplus generated by 
the export of gas pushed up the value of the guilder in 
relation to other currencies. As the guilder appreciated 
(see Table 1.2), imports became cheaper and subsequently 
rose dramatically. 
The exchange rate rose steadily over the period 1971-78. 
Initially many Dutch policymakers welcomed the 
appreciation because of the benefits of cheap 
imports. It 
was thought that a drastic fall 
in the price of imports 
7 
would dampen inflation so long as domestic costs 
(predominantly wages) fully adjust to the higher external 
values. 
Table 1.1: Natural Gas and the State Budqet 
Central government income from Natural Gas sales 
Year as Percent of as Percent of 
the total of National Income 
the Central 
Government income 
1974 4.4 1.4 
1975 8.6 2.8 
1976 11.0 3.6 
1977 11.0 3.8 
1978 9.9 3.4 
1979 8.8 3.1 
1980 11.3 4.2 
1981 14.5 5.5 
Source: Barker, T and Brailovsky, V (eds) 1981, 'Oil or 
Industrv? l Academic Press. 
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Table 1.2: Changes in the value of the guilder 
1971-78 
(per cent chanqes over lorevious year ) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Cumulative 
Relative 
to 
supply 1.0 1.5 3.0 4.5 2.0 1.0 4.0 5.5 24.5 
Relative 
to 
Competitors 
in f oreign 
markets 1.5 2.5 5.5 6.0 2.5 1.5 6.5 3.5 33.5 
Source: Barker and Brailovsky (eds)1981 
But unit wage costs rose faster than import prices 
(in guilder terms), pushing up real incomes and lowering 
profit margins. Prices of Dutch goods became 
significantly less competitive, which caused industrial 
exports and output to decline. As industrial output 
declined, unemployment rose rapidly. Government spending 
had grown very rapidly too and was now taking a larger 
share of GDP than in most West European countries. The 
great bulk of this increase went on transfer payments 
(pensions, unemployment benefits etc), while public 
9 
investment has actually been taking a smaller slice of the 
national income. In view of this, it was argued, the 
benefit of natural gas, instead of being put into more 
productive use, was being wasted. Natural gas became a 
major export sector squeezing the 'traditional' sector 
such as manufactures and food exports. In other words, 
the improvement in the gas balance was matched by an equal 
or worse deterioration in the manufacturing trade of the 
Netherlands. 
The 'Dutch disease' phenomenon is not confined 
to any particular country, be it developed or developing. 
In short many oil producing countries have suffered from 
the so called disease in one way or another. However, one 
cannot completely deny the fact that oil brought some 
benefits to each of the countries in one way or the other. 
Indeed it has. For example, oil transformed the Nigerian 
economy during its heydays in many respects. It provided 
employment, albeit small compared with agriculture, it 
provided some infrastructural development and increased 
Nigeria's Gross domestic Product from what it was in the 
1960s and early 1970s (see chapter 4). But these benefits 
were very patchy and short lived indeed. 
It is important to note that the principles and 
symptoms of the "Dutch disease" are 
the same in every 
economy. What are different are the structural 
ramifications- While we talk about 
I'de-industrialization" 
in the industrial countries like the Netherlands and 
Britain, it is a case of I'de-agriculturalization" 
in 
10 
Nigeria. This study attempts to translate what happened 
in the Dutch industrial economy to the Nigerian 
agricultural economy. Therefore, the object of the 
research has been to examine the impact of the oil export 
sector on the traditional export sector, agriculture, 
particularly for the period 1973 to 1982. The reason for 
choosing 1973 is that it coinsided with the period that 
Nigeria joined the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) (Nigeria actually joined OPEC in 1971) 
and started to earn huge increases in foreign exchange. 
Nigeria's oil, now account for over 95 per cent of total 
export earnings, and for over 35 per cent of its GDP. 
Hence,, the role of oil, which forms the material base of 
the export sector, is examined, using Nigeria as a 
contemporary example of a developing country depending 
primarily on the export resource sector for economic 
growth. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study employs both descriptive and statistical 
analysis. The descriptive method will be used to analyse 
the international aspect of the oil industry, the 
historical development of the oil industry in Nigeria, the 
direct contribution of oil to the economy, the theory of 
Dutch disease and application of the Dutch disease 
syndrome in Nigeria. Statistical methods are used to 
analyse the aftermath of the Dutch disease syndrome in 
Nigeria, by using multiple regression techniques. The 
11 
regression analysis will be used to investigate the 
f ollowing; 
1. whether or not relative price changes have had a 
significant impact on the Nigerian external trade 
2. whether or not the Marshall-Lerner Condition for 
successful devaluation can be satisfied in the Nigerian 
case. 
SOURCES OF DATA 
The main sources of data for this study are the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, Federal Ministry of Finance, International 
Financial Statistics and various other publications and 
periodicals of international nature. The data are limited 
to the period 1960-82. 
, 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 will review some of the activities of the oil 
companies up to the formation of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The chapter will 
also include the causes of the oil price rises in the 
1970s and the response of the consuming countries. 
Chapter 3 will present a historical review of the Nigerian 
oil industry up to the formation of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation and the relationship between Nigeria 
and the oil companies thereafter. 
Chapter 4 will present the direct contribution of oil 
exports to the economy. This 
includes the contribution of 
12 
the oil industry to total exports, employment in the oil 
sector, retained value added in the oil sector, and 
government revenue from oil. Chapter 5 will discuss the 
theory of Dutch disease in terms of spending and resource 
movement effects. Chapter 6 will examine the impacts of 
exchange and other central government policies on the 
macro- economy of Nigeria. Chapter 7 will examine what 
Nigeria might have done to protect the agricultural 
sector. Chapter 8 will analyse the Nigerian foreign 
sector by employing multiple regression techniques and by 
using time-series data for the period 1960-82 with the 
view to investigating the significance of relative prices 
to the Nigerian foreign sector; and also to examine 
whether or not the Marshall-Lerner condition for a 
successful devaluation is satisfied in the Nigerian case. 
Chapter 9 will conclude the study. 
13 
2 
2.1 
THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE OIL INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The effect of oil on the Nigerian economy must be put into 
a world context of the organization of the oil industry 
and also requires a brief account of the history of world 
market oil prices since the early 1970's and their effect. 
That is what the present chapter sets out to do. 
Over the past 30 years, crude oil has become the single 
most important raw material traded in the world, both in 
volume and in value. It is the world's most important 
energy resource and as such holds a strategic position 
near the centre of the world economy, contributing about 
half of all commercial energy consumption. It is sold by 
petroleum companies which vary both in size and type and 
which are usually classified as follows: - 
Malor petroleum companies: these are the very large 
oil companies like Standard Oil of New Jersey (sometimes 
called EXXON, ESSO or Jersey), Royal Dutch/shell, British 
Petroleum, Texas oil Company (or Texaco for short) , Gulf, 
Mobil, and Standard oil of California (sometimes called 
Socal or Chevron). These seven big oil companies are 
sometimes known as the "Seven Sisters". 
Larcfe Independents: these are large private petroleum 
companies which are generally 
integrated (operating in all 
14 
phases of the petroleum industry from exploration to 
marketing and operating on a worldwide basis, such as 
Atlantic Richfield, Conoco, or Petrofina. 
Small Independents: these are small private petroleum 
companies that specialize in certain aspects of the 
petroleum industrys' activities such as exploration, 
production, or marketing. 
Financing companies: these are companies which 
specialize in investing in the petroleum industry such as 
drilling fund companies. 
Promoters: these are small, sometimes one-man, companies 
which specialize in the acquisition and transfer of 
prospective oil fields. 
National Petroleum companies: these are owned by 
individual oil producing countries (or state) 
governments. Besides the above classifications, companies 
can also be classified according to their areas of 
specialization such as refining, pipeline, or gas 
distribution companies. 
However, the major petroleum companies (the 
"Seven Sisters") are the largest and most influencial in 
the world. They represent some of the largest commercial 
enterprises the world has ever seen. At the peak of their 
power, no other international commercial enterprises could 
match the kind of control that a handful of these 
companies were able to maintain over the world's oil 
industry. Sampson(1985) puts it this way; 
15 
11 Their supranational expertise was beyond the 
ability of national governments. Their incomes 
were greater than those of most countries where 
they operated, their fleets of tankers had more 
tonnage than any navy, they owned and administered 
whole Cities in the desert. In dealing with oil 
they were virtually self-sufficient, invulnerable 
to the laws of supply and demand, and to the 
vagaries of the stock markets, controlling all 
the functions of their business ind selling oil 
from one subsidiary to another. " 
Until the early 1970s the industry was dominated by 
these seven international majors who were able to maintain 
control through a well developed and sophisticated 
vertical integration of their operations. This vertical 
integration covered the full range of upstream and 
downstream activities, extending all the way from 
exploration and production, through transportation and 
refining to the marketing and retail outlets for products. 
Despite the large volume of international trade in oil, 
little crude oil was actually traded. Most of the oil 
produced and refined was turned over to the parent 
companies or to affiliates under their control. Thus, the 
operating companies rarely sold any oil in the open 
market. It was estimated that, until recently, over 90 
per cent of oil exports by the major companies were 
composed of transfers from the parent companies to their 
1. Sampson, A. (1985), The Seven Sisters: The great oil Compani 
and the World they made, (Coronet Books). 
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respective subsidiaries. Less than 10 percent of the oil 
produced was sold in the open market. The highly 
concentrated structure of the oil industry was 
characterized as a perfect case of oligopoly. 2 For the 
world crude oil production shares of the majors in 1972 
see appendix Table 2.1. 
However, while we acknowledge the crucial role played 
by these companies in discovering the resource in the 
first place, they did little, if anything, to help their 
host countries in terms of technological and manpower 
developments. Like most businesses, their primary concern 
was their own financial balance sheets, the satisfaction 
of their shareholders and the continued growth and 
strength of their firms world-wide. The allocation of 
benefits between them and their host countries was gravely 
unbalanced and oil prices remained continuously low. The 
continuous low prices of crude oil resulted in low oil 
revenues for the host countries. In 1960 Iraq issued a 
call for action and a number of producing countries formed 
themselves into The Organisation of petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The original members were Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq, to which have been 
2. Penrose, E. (1968)The International oil Industry in the Middl 
East,, Middle East Economic Survey (supplement) August p. 6 
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added Indonesia, Libya, Qatar, Gabon, Nigeria, Algeria, 
Ecuador and United Arab Emirate. 
At a meeting of the Organization held in June 1962 a 
call was made to abandon the low crude oil price policies, 
and a recommendation was made instead for an 
administrative price system which links crude oil prices 
to an index of the prices of goods which the member 
countries need to import. With this in mind, OPEC member 
nations exploited every opportunity to push up prices in 
the 1970s. The opportunities were available through 
recurring supply disruptions during the 1970s. 
Some OPEC members, like Libya, Iran, etc, thought that 
the formation of OPEC meant taking control of their own 
destiny as far as oil prices were concerned. OPEC was 
able to take advantage of the increasing hostilities in 
the Middle East. This subsequently led to a fundamental 
change in the history of international oil pricing. 
It all started during the "Yom Kippur" war on October 
6,1973 as a result of the Egyptian and Syrian 
invasion of 
Israel. Members of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum 
3- 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in support of Egypt and Syria 
3. OAPEC is an Organization in existence 
before OPEC and consi 
mainly of Arab Countries. 
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agreed to cut oil supplies by 5 per cent each month and to 
impose a total embargo on friends of Israel. The embargo 
and supply reduction would only end when Israel withdrew 
from all occupied territories and restored Palestinian 
rights. They also agreed to increase posted prices from 
$3 to $5.12 per barrel; an increase of 70.6 per cent. In 
November of that year, OPEC reduced production by 25 per 
cent by changing the lifting rule from September levels. 
The reduction precipitated an unprecedented spot market 
price increase. 
Similarly, when report came to the OAPEC countries of 
leakages in the embargo, they decided to plug the holes by 
introducing new production cuts that affected all 
countries. In consequence, world production levels 
declined from 47.8 million barrels a day during September 
to 46.2 million barrels a day in October, and then to 43.2 
million barrels a day in November . Spot values of Arab 
light on the Rotterdam market increased from $6.71 per 
barrel on the ist of October to $11.53 per barrel on the 
1st of November and to $19.35 per barrel on the 1st of 
4 December . The 
two reasons advanced for such a dramatic 
increase were; first the sudden nature of the cutback 
which produced an air of uncertainty 
in the market. The 
4. Danielsen, A. L. (1982), The Evolution of OPEC, Harcourt 
Bra, ý 
Jovanovich, Inc. 
19 
second reason was the fact that oil stocks in Europe were 
low. The organization for Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD) countries only had about sixty-five 
days of supply which was considered pretty low for the 
coming winter. 
The steep nominal increase in oil prices in 1973 had 
been largely eroded in real terms by 1978 because of the 
unprecidented inflation that the 1973/74 oil price 
increase is thought to have precipitated. 
2.2 Winter 1978-9 The Iranian Revolution: 
This crisis came just when experts in the West were 
actually forecasting a further fall in oil prices in real 
terms. Nobody had ever thought of problems in the Middle 
East other than the perpetual conflict with Israel. It 
was not until the Iranian oil field strike of October 1978 
which lasted for three weeks that refiners and consumer 
countries alike became concerned. The strike led to the 
fall of the Shah of Iran. The strike was followed by an 
unrelated loss of 500,000 barrels per day of productive 
capacity in Iraq due to a pipeline fire. Almost 
immediately, world production dropped by about 4 million 
barrels a day (from 62.9 to 58.9 million barrels a day) 
over a period of two months. The effect of such a loss in 
reserves was immediately shown in spot price value. Spot 
prices of the "marker" Arabian light jumped to $13.20; 
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some quoted prices were as high as $15.36 per barre, 5 
(versus the official price of $12.70), and Iranian light 
was at a similar level. Extreme Scarcity pushed up prices 
of high quality Emirate crudes like Abu Dhabi Murban to 
$13.75.6 Others sold as high as $17.337 (versus $13.26). 
Even heavy Arabian crude enjoyed premiums of up to 5c over 
the official price, with spot sales at $12.07 and higher. 
The demand was particularly intense for light low-sulphur 
African and North Sea crudes, with premiums running at 
about $1 per barrel. Nigeria particularly benefited from 
the episode because of greater demand for her low-sulphur 
crude. She sold more crude than she was able to deliver. 
Buyers were willing to pay $14.70 for Libyan ES Sider when 
its official price was $13.68 and as much as $14.90 for 
Nigerian Bonney lights and $14.95 for Algerian Saharan 
(premiums of 85c to 93c. ). One of the main reasons why 
prices rose to that unprecedented level was that many 
customers of Iran were deprived of crude due to the 
cessation of supplies from Iran. 
category were Japan and India. 
Countries in that 
In order to meet their own 
5. Verleger Jr. P. K. (1982) Oil Markets in Turmoil, Ballinger 
publishing company Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
6. Petroleum Intelligence Weeklv(PIL4)_, Nov. 6.1978. 
7. Verleger, Op. cit. p. 34. 
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obligations to their customers they had to turn to the 
spot market for supplies. 
In January 20,1979 Saudi Arabia who was covering the 
production loss from Iran, suddenly announced a production 
cut. Before this announcement, Saudi Arabia was producing 
a maximum of 9.8 million with the extra going to the 
Iranian customers but the announcement of a production cut 
reduced and placed a production ceiling of 8.5million 
barrels a day. The cut lasted about three to four weeks 
which brought the total world production down by 
approximately 500,000 barrels a day during February of 
that year only to be restored in March. The effect was 
immediately felt on the spot value, with a rise of 64.5 
per cent of the Arab light crude from $19.09 to $31.40 per 
barrel during the month of February. The value later 
dropped to $25.04 per barrel by the end of March. 
2.3 Mid-Mav 1979 episode: 
What happended this time was a result of the coincidence 
of events on both the demand and supply sides. The demand 
side event was the action of the U. S. Department of Energy 
to introduce in June a $5.00 a barrel 'entitlement' on 
imports of heating oil from the Carribbean. This was 
interpreted outside the U. S as a subsidy on imports which 
drove spot values up by $1.00 to $2.00 within 
twenty-four 
hours - 
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The supply side event was triggered by a statement of 
intention from Saudi Arabia to sell more oil by direct 
sales and less through Aramco partners. Without notice to 
the U. S companies about possible cut back of their 
entitlements, Saudi Arabia reduced their liftings by 
300,000 to 400,000 barrels daily, reducing their lifting 
from 7.3 to 6.8 million barrels a day. As a result spot 
value of Arab light rose from $28.09 per barrel in early 
May to $34.47 in early June and to $34.72 in early July. 
2.4 November 1979: 
In November 1979, Iranian militant students seized the 
U. S embassy in Tehran because of the U. S support for the 
Shah of Iran. In response, the U. S government placed an 
embargo on Iranian oil. As a result, the Iranian crude 
went to the spot market. The U. S action slightly reduced 
the world supply of oil. As the Iranians became more pre- 
occupied with their internal revolution, oil production 
dropped in October and December by 500,000 barrels a day. 
Almost immediately, the spot value of Arab light increased 
from $33.27 to $37.09 per barrel between October and 
November and then increased further to $37.61 per barrel 
in December8 In October - December 1980, the war on the 
Shatt-at-Arab broke out between Iraq and Iran. The war 
8. Verleger, op. cit. p. 37. 
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resulted from border disagreements. The Iraqi president 
made unspecified claims to the Arab speaking Iranian oil 
province of Khuzistan, in addition to the long-standing 
claims of his country to the control of both banks of the 
Shatt-al-Arab - the water way leading from Iraqi Basra and 
Iranian Abadan to the open sea. Iran not quite 
comfortable with the Iraqi claim, made a counter claim of 
the area and fighting broke out. It may also be argued 
that the Iraqi President wanted to take advantage of the 
apparent Iranian internal crisis to 'cut Khomeini down to 
size I and to discourage his agitation amongst the 
population of the Shia holy cities of Nejaf and Kerbela. 
In our view, it is immaterial whichever argument is right, 
what concerns us primarily is the immediate effects of the 
hostilities. All exports from Iran stopped because of the 
fighting and the subsequent blockage of the Shatt-al-Arab 
water way by the Iranians. There followed also the 
bombing of the main loading port of Kharg Island. This 
phenomenon added to a loss of an extra 1 million barrels a 
day and saw a dramatic increase in spot prices from 
$30.38 to $38.23 a barrel. 
OPEC member countries enjoyed quite a substantial 
increase in oil revenues. As Table 2.1 shows, by 1973 the 
world's trade balance with OPEC was $23.00 billion 
in 
OPEC's favour and by 1974 it had reached well over $103 
billion. However, the OPEC countries' fortune brought with 
it massive misfortune for the entire world. 
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2.5 The Consuming-Countries' Response. 
The unprecedented increases in oil prices that dominated 
the early 1970s caused the consuming countries, mainly the 
West, to try to forestall further actions by the OPEC 
countries. It was Henry Kissinger on December 12,1973 - 
the evening of a Common Market Summit meeting in 
Copenhagen - who called for the nations of Western Europe 
to join the United States in an Energy Action Group that 
would collaborate on conserving energy, developing new 
sources of oil, giving oil-producing countries incentives 
to increase supply, and common research efforts. 
Kissinger said that; 
11 while the United States could solve the energy 
problem alone, albeit with great difficulty, it 
was a problem Euro 3e can not solve in 
isolation at all. " 
9. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 13,1973, p-2 Extracts from Dr. 
Henry Kissinger's neinoirs on this subject were published in th 
London Times 4 March 1974. 
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TABLE 2.1 : World Trade Balances in 1973 and 1974 
(mill innp n-F U. S dollars) 
Industrial* OPEC** Non-oil 
Countries Countries LDCS 
1973 : 
Export(f. o. b) 391,884 44,900 87,816 
Import(c. i. f) 401,035 
Trade balance -9,151 
21,900 
+23,000 
111,165 
-23,349 
1974 : 
Export(f. o. b) 521,380 138,900 121,840 
Import(c. i. f) 567,600 
Trade balance -46,220 
35,800 
+103,100 
177,490 
-55,650 
*Seventeen countries consisting of the Group of Ten member 
countries, plus Austria, Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, and Switzerland. 
** Including a few other small oil-exporting LDCS such as 
Brunei and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Source: - International Financial Statistics, IMF, 
Washington, D. C., August 1975. 
Later, Kissinger warned that unless immediate steps 
were taken to overcome the crisis, the world would be 
threatened with a vicious cycle of competition, rivalry 
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and depression such that led to the collapse of the world 
order in the thirties. In 1974, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) was formed which comprises the United States 
and the European countries except France. 
The formation of the IEA actually did little to stop the 
oil price increases. As the world economy recovered, so 
did the demand for oil and prices continued to be high. 
However, some may argue that without the formation of IEA 
and its subsequent actions, world oil prices would have 
been still higher. Whilst the first oil price increase of 
1973/4 is thought to have precipitated an unprecedented 
world inflation that has continued until quite recently, 
the second oil price increase of 1978/9 heralded a major 
world recession which led to a steep decline in the demand 
for oil. Many doubt whether the demand for oil will ever 
return to pre-1973 levels, because one result of the steep 
increase in the price of oil is that there has been a 
great deal of research into ways of burning oil more 
efficiently. New oil driven machinery uses much less oil 
and the same is true of motor cars and aeroplanes. There 
has also been a switch to other sources of energy, 
especially nuclear and hydro-electric energy, whereever 
possible in order to economize on oil. 
In the past year there has been a steep drop in the 
price of oil to levels in real terms below those 
prevailing before the 1973/4 increase. This is attributed 
in part to the continuing sluggish world demand for oil, 
despite the resumption of economic growth in most 
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industrial countries. But the main reason is that it has 
proved impossible to hold down supplies. There are now 
many more oil producing countries than before 1973 - some 
of them, like the UK, not members of OPEC. But OPEC 
itself which worked so well in the 1970's, appears to be 
losing control over its members. Prices may well recover 
from their present very low levels, but it may be a long 
time before there is a return in real terms to the prices 
that ruled in 1978/9. 
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3. 
3.1 
THE DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF OIL IN NIGERIA. 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the discovery and 
development of oil in Nigeria, and describes the present 
structure of the industry in Nigeria. Foreign oil 
companies started to explore in Nigeria from the turn of 
the century. Nigeria at that time lacked the 
technological know-how and financial resources to 
undertake such risky ventures. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the petroleum industry in Nigeria was 
developed mainly by foreign capital and expertise supplied 
by the multinational oil companies. It is only very 
recently that the Government started to actively get 
involved in production activities by acquiring majority 
share holding and by nationalisation. 
The petroleum industry is capital intensive; it 
requires large amounts of investment to pay for heavy 
capital equipment like rigs, tankers, refineries, etc. 
The industry can be seen from two aspects and each of 
these is capable of standing on its own. We have in effect 
the "up" and "down" streams. The "upstream" operations 
are concerned with the initial aspect of exploration, and 
exploitation up to production stages. "Downstream" 
operations deal with all aspects concerned with 
the 
transformation of petroleum resources into final products 
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as well as all aspects of the petrochemical industry. All 
these activities Nigeria could ill afford at the time the 
oil industry came. 
However, the story of oil in Nigeria started with the 
very first attempt by a German company, the Nigerian 
Bitumen Corporation to search for hydrocarbons in the 
southern part of the country in 1908. The company was 
unsuccessful and decided to call off their search in 1914, 
the year the first world war started. The reason for the 
unsuccessful search by the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation 
was three-fold. Firstly, the company had insufficient 
financial resources at their disposal; secondly, qualified 
manpower was limited and lastly inadequate understanding 
of the geology and geography of the country. The failure 
of Nigerian Bitumen Corporation brought with it a major 
set-back in the search for oil in Nigeria- It created an 
air of uncertainty as to the prospects of finding oil by 
any other oil company in Nigeria. And investment in oil 
prospecting in Nigeria became unattractive. 
However, two decades later, another oil company, this 
time the Anglo-Dutch Consortium, decided to break the ice. 
Anglo-Dutch Consortium came to Nigeria as Shell D'Arcy 
(the forerunner of the present Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria). This company started its operations 
in Nigeria in 1937 and was awarded the sole concession 
rights covering the entire country. The second world war 
in effect interrupted the activities of Shell D'Arcy and 
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work did not resume until 1947. 
Shell D'Arcy, forewarned by the mistakes of the 
Bitumen Corporation left no stone unturned, so to speak, 
and was rewarded with crude oil at Oloibiri in the Niger 
Delta areas of Nigeria in 1956. In 1958, Shell started 
oil production and exports from the Oloibiri field in the 
present Rivers State at a rate of 5,100 barrels per day. 
3.2 The importance of Oloibiri Discovery 
The discovery of crude oil at Oloibiri and Afam in 
1956 and subsequent exports of 5,100 barrels per day 
opened a new chapter in the economic history of Nigeria. 
It also brought with it renewed hope for other oil 
companies who previously were very sceptical of finding 
oil in Nigeria. As other oil companies showed interest in 
Nigerian oil search, Nigeria was forced to review her 
concession rights already granted to Shell and extended 
exploratory rights to companies of other nationalities. 
The reasons given for this was that Nigeria wanted the 
acceleration of exploration and at the same time avoid 
over-dependence upon a single company. The increased 
number of concession holders enhanced both the financial 
and negotiating positions of the government with the oil 
companies. 
1 The newcomers were able to obtain concessions 
1. Schatzl, L. H. (1969) Petroleum in Nigeria, Oxford University 
press. Ibadan. 
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in areas abandoned by Shell-BP. Such newcomers were Mobil 
Exploration Nigeria Ltd., an affiliate of the American 
Socony-Mobil oil company in 1961; Gulf, Agip, Safrap (now 
Elf), Tenneco and Amoseas (now Texaco/Chevron) both in the 
onshore and offshore areas of Nigeria. 
Gulf made the first offshore discovery on the Okam 
structure of Bendel State in 1964, and many of the new 
comers were also successful. The exploratory activities of 
the newcomers were greatly enhanced by the presence of 
Shell-B. P. They were able to purchase from Shell some 
geological and geophysical reports and drilling analyses 
already prepared by Shell for their concession areas and 
Shell, on the other hand, was willing to sell because she 
had already abandoned those areas. 
To the Nigerians, the Shell-BP success at Oloibiri 
brought a wind of hope that Nigeria, like most Gulf 
States, was now on the threshold of a great oil wealth. 
Also, February 17,1958 was regarded as a very important 
date in the history of the Nation, namely the date that 
precipitated the first shipment of crude oil. This first 
shipment of oil from Port Harcourt Harbour for Holland was 
received in a ceremony by the then Nigerian representative 
in the United Kingdom, Mr. Mathew Mbu. And so the 
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quantity of crude oil exported doubled every year and 
attained its all time peak in 1979 at the rate of 117 
million metric tons per annum. 
3.3 Quality of Crude Oil in Nigeria 
Nigeria is not only blessed with crude oil, she 
is also blessed with a good quality crude. The high 
quality comes from the high American Petroleum Institute 
(API) . 
It is common practice in refining petroleum to produce 
fuel oils complying with several specifications prepared 
by the American Society for Testing and Materials(ASTM) 
and adopted as a commercial standards by the U. S. Bureau 
of standards such as the API. API grades crude oil 
according to gravity and viscosity, the lightest being 
No. 1 and the heaviest No. 6. Grades 5 and 6 generally 
require heating for satisfactory pumping and burning. 
2 
Nigeria has for a long time derived a lot of advantages 
from her high quality oil. For instance, high gravity 
crudes yield more of the light end- products(fuel oil) 
during processing and the light end- products command the 
highest prices in the products market, especially in the 
warm seasons. The low sulphur content meets the pollution 
2. Steam: Its generation and useL. (1975) p. 5-17, published by 
Babcock and Wilcox. 
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standards in major markets like U. S. A; Japan etc and it is 
not surprising why the U. S. A. is Nigeria's major customer 
for oil. High gravity and low sulphur content reduces the 
cost of processing considerably, as no extra cost is 
incurred for "cracking" (i. e. subjecting the crude to an 
intense heat) and I'desulphurization" (i. e. removing 
sulfhur from crude oil) facilities to meet basic 
requirements of designated markets. The quality of crude 
oil, especially with regard to viscosity, affects its flow 
through pipelines. If the oil is very waxy and/or very 
heavy like the Serir crude oil in Libya, its flow has to 
be aided by heating the pipe, which tends to raise the 
cost of pipeline transportation. The Nigerian crude's wax 
content is low compared with those of some fields in Libya 
and the Middle Eastern countries. The high quality is 
reflected in oil prices because they attract premiums 
which are added to the marked crude price. The level of 
such premiums is better appreciated when it is realised 
that some of the Nigerian crude streams command the 
highest prices in the global oil market. Another crude 
that has a similar advantage is the U. K. North Sea oil. 
With a view to maximizing the benefit accruing from 
her oil resource, Nigeria established a national oil 
company named the Nigerian National oil Corporation (NNOC) 
by Decree No. 18 in 1971. Also in June the same year, 
Nigeria joined the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) as the 11th member country. In order to 
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create a more virile oil agency, and optimise the scare 
human and infrastructure resources available to 
Government, the NNOC and the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources were merged to form the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977. The functions of 
NNPC necessarily combined the commercial objectives of the 
NNOC (namely, exploration, production, transportation, 
refining, processing oil, marketing of crude oil and 
products). NNPC's main function is to conduct research 
relating to the petroleum industry and the results of such 
undertaking made public. This function, the NNPC has to 
do in addition to the general functions of NNOC which it 
inherited. 
At different stages in the evolution of the country's 
oil industry, Government has successfully negotiated and 
taken over increasing levels of participating interests in 
oil producing companies. By 1977 when NNPC was 
established, Nigeria had acquired majority participating 
interest in all the oil producing companies. The state of 
Government participation in each company is shown in 
appendix Table 3.1. 
3.4 Production sharina Arranaement/contract (PSA/PSC) 
In the early seventies, some OPEC member countries 
particularly, Indonesia pioneered a prodution 
sharing 
arrangement which vested 100 per cent control 
in the host 
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Government. In view of the success of that arrangement, 
Nigeria followed suit in 1973 with the Ashland oil 
company. The rationale for entering into this kind of 
agreement with the oil companies is for the host countries 
to safeguard themselves from technological, manpower and 
financial inadequacies confronting them. PSA is where a 
company, in this case Ashland, is required to put up the 
necessary funds to explore, develop and produce oil on 
behalf of the Government. Thereafter, their proceeds 
would be 40% of the production for the recovery of costs 
and payment of royalties, and 55% of the rest to offset 
Petroleum Profit Tax(PPT) while the balance,, 5%, defined 
as "Profit oil" is shared 65/35% between Government and 
the company for production up to 50,000 b/d; and 70/30% 
when production topped 50,000 b/d. PSA is said to have a 
number of shortcomings. For example, the foreign oil 
company may wish to limit its exploratory activities once 
it strikes oil in commercial quantities in order to 
minimize risks. That means that she has to concentrate her 
activities on such oilfields where no further exploratory 
investments are required. 
Between January, 1978 and July, 1979, the Government 
increased its participation interests in the oil producing 
companies to 60% and in August 1979, the Government 
nationalised all British Petroleum (BP) interests in 
Shell-BP because of her alleged involvement with South 
Africa, thus increasing her participation interest in 
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Shell to 80%. As a result of this, the Federal Government 
has a right to about 70% of total oil produced in the 
country. 
3.5 Risk Service Contract (RSC) 
September 1979 witnessed another experiment in the 
petroleum industry as NNPC moved from the production 
sharing contract to a Risk Service Contract in the 
unallocated acreage areas of the country. Agip Africa, 
Elf Aquitane and Nigus Petroleum companies had entered 
into Risk Service Contracts with NNPC. To them, it is "a 
more specific form of contract than a production sharing 
Contract/Agreement and offers more concrete advantages 
than those of the PSAII. 
3 Under a Risk Service Contract, 
the company provides all funds for exploration, 
development and production of oil. Each service contract 
is related to a separate block or contract area; the 
primary term is between two or five years, after which, if 
there is no discovery, the contractor forfeits all rights 
in the contract area. If a commercial discovery is made, 
the contractor will be repaid his investments, and as an 
incentive for the risk taken, be paid a remuneration based 
on an agreed formula. It also has the first option 
to 
purchase a fixed quantity of crude oil produced 
from the 
3. Onoh, J. K. (1983) The Nigerian oil Economy_, _ 
Croom Helm 
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contract area. 
3.6 Crude oil sales 
NNPC is also bestowed with the responsibility of 
selling the government's own 70% share of total oil 
produced by the international oil companies and with the 
proceeds paid directly into Federal Government accounts. 
As a matter of policy, NNPC sells oil to customers without 
any intermediaries. The customers are mostly direct oil 
users, and include all Government joint venture partners. 
Oil sales are made to all customers at exactly the same 
price i. e the Official Selling Price (OSP). There is a 
non-discrimination policy in customer relations. The 
Government sometimes directs NNPC to extend credit 
facilities of 90 days instead of the commercial 30 days to 
some neighbouring African countries for whom oil sales are 
approved. This 90 days' credit to governments of poor 
developing countries is the only area of preferential or 
unequal treatment given to other customers. All oil sold 
by NNPC is on long term contract. Speculation in the spot 
markets is not part of Nigerian sales activities. 
3.7 Setting of oil prices 
Nigeria is a member of OPEC which fixes both 
quantities to be produced by each member, as well as 
prices. Prices are fixed relative 
to the OPEC Marker crude 
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price to which other crudes are linked according to their 
respective qualities. The marker crude price is arrived 
at by examining all the factors of supply and demand. 
Among the demand factors that are considered are the 
competitive standing of oil vis-a-vis other energy 
sources, rates of inflation in general but particularly in 
so far as they affect the imports of member-countries. 
The supply factors considered are, the cost of production, 
and transport costs. Decisions concerning the quantity to 
be produced take account of the individual member 
countries financial needs. For example, Nigeria may be 
allowed to increase production if she faces some major 
financial problems. But that increased production would 
be counter-balanced by a decrease in production by another 
member willing to help Nigeria out. In most cases Saudi 
Arabia has always made this sacrifice. Nevertheless, 
whatever prices these factors indicate, OPEC still allows 
considerable political consideration to depress the price 
level indicated for the welfare of all nations. As a 
result, OPEC fixes only the prices for the marker crude 
and the other forty-two different crudes produced 
in 
member countries are assessed to take account of 
deviations in quality and freight. 
As we saw earlier, Nigerian oil has a high premium 
because of its low sulphur content. The premium varies 
from time to time, but for instance in ealy 1981, 
it was 
4 
about U. S. $8 when the Saudi marker price 
was U. S. $32 
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Its quality is comparable to that of Britain's. If prices 
are to be maintained, there is need for discipline amongst 
members in maintaining both the price and production 
allocations. otherwise the market collapses in a price war 
as has been happening recently. In Nigeria the 
joint venture partners of the Government normally put 
their 30% oil share through their own systems for down 
stream operations. Like most oil producing countries, 
what the producing company gets on each barrel of its 
equity oil in Nigeria is: 
- a: recovery of the Actual Technical cost of 
production and 
- b: a profit margin. 
Currently, the profit Margin is $1.6 per barrel while 
the theoretical technical cost is also $1.6 per barrel. 
The Government gets 70% of the 100% crude production plus 
royalties. The Government can either tax the 100% crude 
before or ofter taking her share of the crude. 
In summary, therefore, it could be seen that 
joining 
the OPEC in July 1971 brought two important benefits 
for 
Nigeria. First, it shifted the government's 
interests 
away from the mere collection of royalties and other 
dues 
Price Service, 1981. 
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which the oil companies offered to pay to it, to active 
involvement in the oil industry by the establishment of 
national oil Corporation, which was immediately charged 
with responsibilities for all upstream and down stream 
activities in the industry and actually introducing 
Decrees binding the oil companies. Nigeria's involvement 
in the oil production activities herself is beneficial 
because that was the only way she could acquire the oil 
technology. Second, Nigeria also benefited from the oil 
price increases which resulted from the collective actions 
of OPEC members. 
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THE CONTRIBUTION OF OIL TO THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
4.1 Introduction 
Oil has been described as the pillar, engine and 
lifeline of the Nigerian economy. ' The reliance on oil 
has increased enormously since petroleum was first 
produced in commercial quantities in 1958. We shall 
examine the contribution of the petroleum sector, under 
the following headings; its contribution to - 
a) The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Government revenues 
c) External transactions; that is 
- Foreign exchange earning, and 
- Balance of payments (BOP); 
d) Linkage with other domestic industries 
Employment 
Provision of basic Infrastructure 
Its effect on Nigerian agriculture and agricultural 
exports will be properly examined in Chapter 
4.2 oil sector's contribution to GDP: - 
Historically, Nigeria had depended on the rural 
sector -agriculture for her exports and for much of her 
internal consumption. The reason for this was obvious. 
Nigeria had a clear comparative advantage in agricultural 
-------------------- 
1. Concord Weekly, 6 May 1985, p. 7 
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production for export. The Colonial Government promoted 
the production of cash crops for export - both as a means 
of paying for manufactured imports and to generate a cash 
income that could be taxed to pay f or government services 
The dominant role of agriculture in the Nigerian economy 
at the time of independence can be seen in its share in 
terms of percentage contribution to the Gross Domestic 
Product as shown in Table 4.1. As Table 4.1 depicts, the 
agricultural sector started slowing down from 1965 from 
its high of 60% of GDP in 1960. In 1965, the agricultural 
contribution fell to 48 %. In 1977 it fell to 25 % and in 
1980 it recorded an all time low of 22 %. The data 
represents how by the late 1960s and early 1970s oil 
transformed the economy of Nigeria and made very 
significant increases in the economy's GDP. 
TABLE 4.1: GDP BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN AT CONSTANT 1977 
PRICES (N-MILLION). 
1960 % 1965 % 1970 % 1975 % 1980 % 
Agric. 6352.5 60 6927 48 7255 38 7639 28 7149 22 
oil 441.5 4 2223 16 4221 22 6276 23 7658 24 
Manuf. 241.7 2 286 2 743 4 1186 4 2245 7 
others 4333.8 34 4910 34 7117 36 12070 45 15121 47 
Total 11370 100 14346 100 19336 100 27171 100 32173 
100 
Source: -Simplified version of Appendix Tables 
4.1and 4.1A. 
Crude oil occupied the commanding heights of the 
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nation's economy, making agriculture less significant than 
it used to be within relatively few years of its 
discovery. It is equally important to notice that, since 
1960, the yearly share of crude petroleum has consistently 
surpassed that of manufacturing in GDP terms and narrowed 
the gap between it and the share of agriculture although 
GDP contribution in manufacturing has been on the increase 
except during the civil war years (1965-1969). 
4.3 The Oil sector's contribution to Governnent 
Revenue 
Legally and constitutionally, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria has an uncontestable right of 
possession of all commercial minerals within Nigeria's 
territorial boundaries. 
As a result it is the Federal Government alone that is 
allowed to either directly exploit the minerals or grant 
permission to whomever she wishes to do so, while charging 
such royalties, rents, fees, premia that may pertain. 
Also it is the Federal Government that allocates some of 
these sums to the state Governments in terms of annual 
allocations depending, of course, on how much was 
collected. The amounts of such contributions 
to 
Government revenue are listed in Appendix Table 4.1 
for 
the years 1958 to 1984. As can be seen 
in Appendix Table 
4.1, oil revenue rose from a mere N80 million 
in 1969 to 
N219 million in 1970. From then on, the revenue rose 
astronomically to more 
than N13 billion in 1980 but fell 
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to nearly half that figure in 1984. Its percentage 
contribution to Federal Government revenue also rose 
progressively to dominate all other sources of the Federal 
Government revenue. 
The contribution of oil to government revenue accrues in 
a number of ways, ranging from profit taxes, royalties, 
premia for the acquisition of concessions to rental 
charges. Following the rapid development of exploration 
and production, total oil revenue paid to the government 
also rose from N3 million in financial year 1960 to N5187 
million in financial year 1976 as Appendix Table 4.3 
shows. 
"Royalty and profit taxes accruing to the 
government per barrel of crude oil produced were 
substantially increased in May 1971. This was 
due to revised agreements between the Nigerian 
Government and the Petroleum Companies, which 
became effective retroactively from March 20th 
1971., 12 
This, however, is not surprising because if we recall, from 
Chapter 3, Nigeria joined the OPEC in 1971 and since then, 
her oil policies have been in line with those of all OPEC 
member nations. As can be seen in Appendix Table 4.3, oil 
profit tax still makes the highest contribution with 79.5% 
of the government's domestic oil revenues in 1976. This 
figure, however, fell to 59.0% in 1983 and to 57.3% in 
1984. 
4.4 Oil sector's contribution to External 
Transactions: 
4.4.1 Foreign Exchange Earnincfs: - For most developing 
-------------------- 
World Bank countrv economic Reports 
Nigeria, options for Long-Term Development, 1974 
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countries, the inadequacy of foreign exchange earnings 
constitutes a serious bottleneck in the process of 
development. But Nigeria has only recently begun to be 
faced with that kind of problem; thanks to petroleum 
exports. The foreign exchange earnings have, for a long 
time, been a vital aspect of the petroleum contribution 
and therefore deserves proper attention. As shown in 
Table 4.2 Nigeria started oil exports in 1958 with a 
meagre value of N1.8million. Some years after 1958 and 
1960, Nigeria started witnessing a dramatic increase in 
crude oil export earnings. While oil export earnings in 
1958 represented less than 1% of the total export of 
N265.4 million, they rose to 32% in 1964,79.4% in 1970, 
93% in 1975 and 98% in 1981 respectively. Although, until 
1980 the value of traditional (agricultural) exports also 
increased, they came to constitute an ever smaller 
proportion of the value of total exports. since 1969, even 
before the big oil price increases, crude oil has come to 
dominate exports not only in value, but in volume too. 
Table 4.3 shows the relationship between quantity of 
petroleum produced and that exported from 1960-1982. While 
the quantity of petroleum produced and exported before 
1965 were negligible, from 1970 oil started making a 
significant impact in Nigeria's foreign sector. In 1965, 
total oil exports was less than 4 million metric tons, by 
1976 it rose to 107million metric tons with an all 
time 
high Of 117 million metric tons in 1979. It declined 
in 
1980,1981 and 1982. The relationship between 
total 
exports and oil exports 
in Table 4.2 is expressed as a 
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graph in Fig. 4.1. It shows how reliant the Nigerian 
economy has become on crude petroleum for her foreign 
exchange earnings. 
However, it is important to point out at this 
stage that the figures referred to are only gross and do 
not give an accurate account of oil's net contribution to 
foreign exchange earnings. This is so because they 
not take into account what was actually repatriated. 
do 
As 
was stated in Chapter 2. the petroleum industry was until 
recently largely owned by foreign companies. As part of 
the incentives to attract them, the Federal Government of 
Nigeria made special arrangements with the oil companies 
to allow them to retain abroad part of the foreign 
exchange proceeds of the export of crude. This is partly 
amortization and transfer of profits but a part of it is 
also needed to pay for imports of machinery used by the 
industry. The mere fact that some of the foreign exchange 
earned are repatriated abroad reduces the impact of the 
oil industry on Nigeria's balance of payments. It is 
therefore prudent to consider the net impact of the oil 
sector by examining its overall contribution to the 
balance of payments. 
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Table 4.2 -- Crude Oil Export as a Percentage of Total Exports in 
Nigeria ON million) 
Traditional 
ear Export 
Commodities 
L958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
19-/6 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
263.5 
315.8 
110.3 
112.3 
115.1 
129.3 
135.6 
150.0 
132.5 
125.0 
123.1 
125.4 
131.7 
245.7 
162.4 
363.0 
435.0 
350.0 
425.0 
523.0 
627.0 
670.0 
554.0 
189.0 
121.0 
Crude Oil 
Exports 
1.8 
5.2 
8.4 
22.6 
34.4 
40.4 
64.0 
136.2 
184.0 
142.4 
77.6 
301.6 
509.6 
1,053.0 
1,176.2 
12006.0 
,01 :; 671.0 
766.0 
-;, 9 18.0 
- ', 5'. 0 
6,005.0 
437.0 
y247.0 
0,247.0 
3,584.0 
Total Export 
265.5 
321.0 
118.7 
134.9 
149.5 
169.7 
199.6 
286.2 
316.5 
267.4 
200.7 
4227.0 
641.3 
1,298.7 
11V 338.6 
2,369.0 
6,106.0 
5y 116.0 
6,343.0 
7 /7 , 79 /. 
0 
6) 632.0 
101107.0 
12.1801.0 
IOY 436.0 
8. %705.0 
Percentage of 
Crude Oil 
to Total Export 
0.7 
1.6 
7.0 
16.7 
23.0 
23.8 
32.0 
47.5 
58.1 
53.2 
38.6 
70.6 
79.4 
81.1 
87.8 
84.6 
92.9 
93.2 
93.3 
93.5 
90.5 
93.4 
95.8 
98.2 
98.6 
SOURCE: NNPCP Pptrolnum. Economics and its impact on National Plans; 
Document produced by the Economic Research Unit 1982 
ýunpublished). 
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Table 4.3 
Nigeria Crude Oil Production and Exports 1960-1982 
(000 Metric Tons) 
Year Production Exports % of crude 
oil exports 
1960 n n n 
1965 14,000 3,640 30 
1966 22,000 7,260 33 
1967 17,000 5,270 31 
1968 8,000 1,520 19 
1969 29,000 13,050 45 
1970 57,000 54,000 97 
1971 81,000 79,000 97 
1972 93,000 92,000 99 
1973 109,000 105,000 96 
1974 119,000 115,000 97 
1975 94,000 90,000 96 
1976 110,000 107,000 97 
1977 111,000 108,000 97 
1978 100,000 96,000 96 
1979 122,000 117,000 96 
1980 109,000 101,000 93 
1981 74,000 64,000 85 
1982 56,000 44,000 78 
Note: n= negligible. 
Source: NNPC (1982), Progress of Public Sector Participation in the 
Nigerian Oil Industry; NNPC document (unpublished). 
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Figure 4.1 A Graphic Relationship Between Total Exports and Oil Exports 
1966 19168 
Source: Table 4.2. 
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50 
4.4.2 Contribution to Balance of payment (BOP): 
Recall that the reason for looking at the contribution to 
the balance of payments differently was because the 
figures shown previously give a false impression. What we 
then intend to do here is to focus attention on that 
proportion of the foreign exchange receipts from oil which 
the companies had to retain in Nigeria to finance their 
local expenditures and to meet their statutory 
obligations. Local expenditures mainly include wages and 
salaries, and statutory obligations such as the payments 
of rents, royalties, profit tax and other fees like 
harbour dues and port charges from 1960 to 1982. Table 
8.1 shows Nigeria's balance of payments position from 
1974 to 1982. The Table reveals that the oil sector has 
substantially dominated the export sector. 
It can therefore, be concluded that the oil sector has for 
a very long time enhanced the position of Nigeria's 
balance of payments considerably. 
4.5 Oil Sector's linkage with other domestic 
industries: - 
Even though Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product has 
increased over the years (as Appendix Tables 4.1 and 4.1A 
reveal) due to increased value added in the oil industry, 
this does not necessarily imply that there was real 
economic development as will be explained later. The oil 
industry's value added increased as a result of increased 
crude oil production since the end of the Nigerian civil 
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war, and the two major increases in price in 1973 and 
1978/9. These are in no way true reflections of economic 
development of the local economy. Similarly, a great 
amount of the industry's value added are subsequently 
taken out of the economy in the form of factor payments 
abroad, which severely reduces its contribution to GNP. 
more important yardstick of measuring the industry's 
lasting contribution to economic development is the case 
A 
of its linkages with the local economy. That is, how the 
presence of the oil industry precipitates the 
establishment of other industries to supply inputs into 
the oil industry itself and derive their expansion 
directly from the oil industry's increased activities. on 
these points, the oil industry's contribution has been 
minimal. Take Appendix Table 4.4 for instance, which 
shows the Nigerian oil industry's expenditure on goods and 
services between 1938 and 1974. It shows the extent of the 
oil industry's reliance on imported goods and services. 
This reveals the lack of domestic factors of the right 
kind; so that Nigeria was not able to supply the inputs 
needed for expansion and the oil industry continued to 
rely on imported inputs. Indeed one might use columns 
and 5 as a basis for reasoning and to observe an inverse 
relationship between oil output and the proportion of the 
oil industry's local outlay. Appendix Table 4-4 also 
suggests that in the period 1938-1962 through 1974, with a 
single exception of 1963 when 48% of total factor payments 
were made locally, the normal proportions have ranged from 
25 percent to 42 percent. The locally supplied goods and 
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services consist mainly of such things as electricity 
supply, telephone and postal services and the use of land. 
Local outlays also comprised customs duties and various 
grants and subventions. (see Appendix Table 4.5 )- In 
other words, the locally supplied goods and services do 
not include any of the industry's basic requirements of 
such technically complex inputs as onshore and offshore 
drilling rigs (including submersibles and semi- 
submersible), production platforms, concrete and steel 
structures and a host of other materials and equipment of 
advanced technology. The provision for forward linkage is 
equally not there. Businesses to make use of the oil 
industry's products as inputs such as petrochemical have 
only recently been sited in Nigeria with locations at 
3 Kaduna, Warri and Port Harcourt. The only source of 
forward linkage which Nigeria to date has utilised is the 
petroleum refining. There are three refineries now in 
Nigeria and the fourth is being sited in Port Harcourt. 
Another source of forward linkage is the exploitation of 
the natural gas in Nigeria and its use as inputs in other 
industries. Until quite recently natural gas in Nigeria 
has been flared, but the Federal Government is now 
actively pursuing the idea of establishing a liquified 
4 Natural Gas (LNG) plant. We have seen that the oil 
3. Petrochemicals Phase 11 projects scaled down; The United 
Bank for Africa Monthlv Business and Economic Digest Vol. 8 Nos 
and 2 Jan/Feb. 1985. 'Petrochemicals Industry, a key to 
development plan in Nigeria', Financial Times Nov. 29, 
1982. See also Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation: The 
structure of Finance packages for Major Petrochemical Project, 
Sept., 1982. 
4. The 1985 Budget and oil projects: The United Bank for Africa 
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industry has made important contributions to the economy. 
4.6 Oil sector contribution to local Emplovment: - 
In the sphere of local employment, the oil 
industry's record is no more encouraging. The oil 
industry as a whole had 2,896 Nigerians in their 
employment at the end of 1960. This number rose to 3,578 
at the end of 1970 and increased to only 19,634 in 1977, 
(see Appendix Table 4.7). 
Part of the reason 'is that there is a scarcity of 
appropriately trained and qualified local manpower which 
limits effective Nigerian participation. Nigerian 
entrepreneurs, and Nigerian directors of the foreign oil 
companies need to press for more rapid and effective 
training of Nigerian technicians for the oil industry. 
Unfortunately due to lack of official statistics on the 
total number of people in employment for a number of 
years, comparison with other sectors is greatly hampered. 
But to illustrate the small amount of employment created 
in the mining sector as a whole, we use the estimated 1975 
and 1980 figures presented in Table 4.5 to compare the 
amount of employment created in this sector. 
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TABLE 4.4: - ESTIMATED TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN DIFFERENT 
SECTORS 1975 AND 1980 . 
Sector 
(N. million) 
Estimated Estimated Additional 
Employment Employment Employment 
% % 1975- % 
1975 share 1980 share 1980 share 
Agriculture 17.86 64.0 
Mining& Quar. 0.11 0.4 
Manuf. & Crafts 4.69 16.8 
Building& Const. 0.25 0.9 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water 0.03 0.1 
Distribution 3.41 12.2 
Transport and 
Communication 0.17 0.6 
Services 1.39 5.0 
Total (%) 27.91 100 
19.44 61.2 1.58 41.1 
0.13 0.4 0.02 0.5 
6.03 19.0 1.34 34.8 
0.51 1.6 0.26 6.8 
0.03 0.1 
3.75 11.8 
0.19 0.6 
1.68 5.3 
31.76 100 
0.34 8.8 
0.02 0.5 
0.29 7.5 
3.85 100 
Source: - Nigeria-Third National Development Plan. 
0 However, it must be noted that, because of high capital 
intensity in the oil industry, any expansion in operations 
will in general reflect an increase or expansion of 
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capital investment rather than employment of labour. This 
means that oil industry employment as a whole is not 
likely to increase significantly in the future, though one 
can expect a gradual increase in the number of jobs of 
technician and above which will be held by Nigerians. 
4.7 Provision of basic infrastructure: - 
The first direct advantage which Nigeria derived 
from the operations of the oil industry was in the form of 
useful geological information covering large parts of the 
country. For example, through information obtained from 
its operations, Shell-BP was able to produce for the 
Government a number of geological and topographical maps 
covering large parts of the country. The most important 
aspect of this is the access given to formerly 
inaccessible and what most people at that time thought to 
be dangerous areas like the Niger Delta. 
Shell-BP built roads and bridges that at that time aided 
local transportation. These roads and bridges were 
initially built by Shell-BP to facilitate the movement of 
their materials to the oil wells. Although the oil 
industry is thought to generate very insignificant amount 
of local employment, Shell-BP nevertheless assisted 
in the 
area of human resource development. Shell with 
its 
pioneering initiative established local schools, on-the- 
job training schemes, scholarship awards, and other forms 
of educational grants to the government. 
In 1959, Shell 
established a Training school for 
junior technicians in 
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Port Harcourt to provide three-year full-time courses to 
selected students. 5 The school had an annual intake of 
about 100 and trained students to the level of the 
intermediate certificate of the London City and Guilds 
Institute. Also in 1960, another Training Centre was 
established by Shell in Port Harcourt where short-term 
courses were provided for the company's supervisory and 
executive staff. By so doing, about 2,000 Nigerians 
received training of one sort or another by the end of 
1965.6 The kindof students Shell was interested in and 
actuallyto whom it gave scholarships were engineers, oil 
technologists, other scientists and accountants. An 
official of Shell-BP had this to say; 
It is as appropriate to the field 
of manpower development as it is to 
farming to say that you only reap 
where you have sown, and it is with 
confidencethat Shell-BP looks 
forward to the harvests of tomorrow". 7 
However, there were two basic reasons why Shell-BP 
undertook this kind of activity. One of them was 
that when the company arrived Nigeria, there was no 
ready made manpower adequate for her operations, and 
in order to carry out some of the activities some 
personnel had to be trained. The second reason was 
that some of the local residents of the affected 
-------------------- 
(UBA) Monthly Business and Economic Digest Jan/Feb. 1985, p. 4. 
5. Shell-BP; Petroleum Development Company. Training 
in Nigeria (1962) p-17. 
6. Shell-BP; (1966), Shell-BP School Programme p. 
9. 
7. The Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria, The 
Sh ! 11 -BP _gjpry 
(Port Harcourt) March 1965, p. 34. 
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areas requested that Shell-BP entered into an 
agreement, albeit on a small scale, to provide those 
amenities as compensation for the land given to 
Shell-BP. 
In summary, when one moves away from the 
cniestion of immediate gain to the longer-lasting . JL- 
impact - that of real economic development - the oil 
industry in Nigeria made a small direct contribution 
despite big increases in oil revenues. A World Bank 
report described the presence of petroleum in Nigeria 
as f ollows: 
"At present, petroleum remains a typical enclave 
industry whose contribution to the Nigerian 
economy is limited largely to its contribwtion to 
government revenue and foreign exchange. " 
-------------------- 
John 
8. World Bank, ns for lonq-term Development 
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5. THE THEORIES OF THE DUTCH DISEASE SYNDROME 
11 Many oil exporters now seem to think, and some 
even publicly admit, that the "oil bonanza" has 
not been a clear or unmitigated blessing for 
them. A disenchanted statesman among OPEC 
insiders goes as far as to say that history may 
show that the oil exporting countries have 
gained the least, or lost the most, from the 
discovery and development of their resources". 1 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact 
of an export boom in a small open economy. The essence of 
the discussion is to describe how an economy can react to 
the emergence of a new major export industry, or, 
alternatively to a significant rise in the international 
price of one resource, in this case oil. Here we would be 
able to argue that the emergence of the oil sector in most 
oil exporting countries has had negative repercussions on 
the rest of the economy, and has particularly affected the 
export competitiveness of the "other tradeable goods" 
sector. This phenomenon has been associated with the 
theory of 'Dutch disease, 
2. The Dutch disease syndrome is 
where an increase in the export of a particular commodity, 
in our case oil, results in a real appreciation of the 
1. Attiga. A. A. (1981)1 Economic Development of oil 
producing countries' OPEC Bulletin, Nov. p. 7 
2. For the origin of 'Dutch diseaselsee chapter 1. 
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exchange rate, and in a loss of competitiveness of the 
traditional (non-oil) tradeable goods sector. Where this 
has occurred in industrial countries, the phenomenon has 
also been called de-industrialization; the term 
'tradeable-squeeze effects, 3 is also sometimes used. We 
hasten to add that the term Ide-industrialization' was 
originally used in Britain to describe the alleged effects 
of a growth of the oil sector on manufacturing. 4 
5.2 THE MODEL 
We begin first by arguing that an increase in the 
price of oil will result in a higher disposable income, 
and in an increase in the domestic demand for tradeables 
and nontradeable goods. This income effect will result in 
a higher relative price of nontradeables, and in the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. This is known as 
the spending effect. 5 Secondly, and perhaps more 
3. Corden,, W. M. and Neary. J. P. (1982) . 'Booming sector and 
De-industrialization in a small open Economy, Economic 
Journal 92, December. 
4. Corden, W. M., (1984) Booming sector and Dutch disease 
Economics: Survey and consolidation, Oxford Economic 
Papers 36 p. 359-380. 
5. Corden, W. M. and Neary, J. P. (1982). p. 826. 
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important, an increase in the price of oil will tend to 
generate a balance of payments surplus, and an 
accumulation of foreign reserves (see chapter 4). 
If this increase in foreign reserves is not fully 
sterilized, the monetary base will also increase and 
inflation will result. 
There is also a 'resource movement' effect. 6 The export 
boom pulls labour away from the 'lagging' sector into the 
non-tradeables and the booming sectors. Thus, the net 
effect is that the output of the lagging sector will fall. 
For the purpose of this analysis the oil sector is known 
as the 'booming' sector, the tradeables or the lagging 
sector includes traditional exports and import substitutes 
in both agriculture and in manufacturing( but in this case 
we talk more about agriculture because of the rural nature 
of the Nigerian economy ) and the non-tradables, include 
construction and services such as public utilities, 
transportation, and so forth. 
In making this investigation we consider a small open 
economy, with a fixed exchange rate, 
7 that produces three 
Ibid. p-826. 
7. This assumption is made to suit some oil exporting 
developing countries that operate a fixed rate with 
respect to the U. S. dollar (i. e. Indonesia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela. etc. ) 
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goods,, oil (0), other tradables (agriculture and 
manufactures) (T) and non-tradables (N). Also we assume, 
for simplicity, that the exchange rate is equal to one. 
(This assumption is relaxed later). The excess demand for 
nontradeables is assumed to depend on prices and income. 
We also assume that domestic residents do not consume oil 
- or consume negligible amounts relative to exports - and 
that factors used in the production of oil are sector- 
specific both in the short and long run. This is a 
reasonable assumption because of the capital intensity of 
oil production. These assumptions will be relaxed later. 
We assume that the oil sector is owned by the government. 
Again, this assumption is not unreasonable in view of what 
pertains in most oil exporting countries particularly the 
developing countries. However, if the initial excess 
demand for nontradeable goods depends on prices and income 
as stated in our assumption, we would expect this excess 
demand to be equal to zero in equilibrium. This is 
written as: 
N= N(qT, Y)= ................ 
(+) (+) 
(5.1) 
where N is excess demand for nontradeables, qT 
is the 
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relative price of tradeables to non-tradeable goods (i. e. 
T: --p Tý P N) , and Y, 
is real income in terms of non- 
tradeables. The relative price of oil is excluded here 
since we assumed a negligible domestic consumption of oil 
and the factors used in the production of oil are sector- 
specific both in the short and long run. The signs in 
parentheses below the functions indicate our assumption of 
the partial derivatives and because the signs are positive 
means an assumption of gross substitutability between the 
tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Because the non- 
tradeables are in equilibrium excess demand will be equal 
to zero. 
In (5-1), Y is expressed in terms of non-tradeable 
goods and is given by 
S 
Y=H+q+ Hý +q0...................... (5.2) 
NT10 
where HS,, H 
S 
and o are supplies of the non-tradeables, NT 
tradeables and oil, respectively, and where qo is the 
relative price of oil in terms of non-tradeable goods. For 
simplicity we hold the supply of oil as fixed. We denote 
the price index as PI which depends on the nominal prices 
of non-tradeables (P N) and 
tradeables (P T ). Our 
intention 
here is to find out what happens to the relative price of 
traditional tradeables with respect to non-tradeables (q T) 
in the event of an increase in oil price. Maintaining the 
assumption of gross substitutability, the equilibrium 
situation in the non-tradables market can 
be depicted as 
in Figure 5.1 
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Although Edwards and Aoki8 did not provide any 
explanation as to what determines Pt/Po or why Pt/Po must 
cut NN where it did, a possible explanation for that could 
be the "law of one price. 11 The law of one price states 
that,, ignoring transport costs , traded goods command the 
same prices everywhere. This explanation may be only 
applicable to countries that export primary materials like 
cocoa,, rubber, groundnut etc. that are traded 
internationally with prices fixed. However, this is only 
an assumption that may be over simplified. 
Figure 5.1: The price of oil and other tradeables in 
relation to the price of non-tradeables. 
N 
qT7 PTýPN) 
qo T 
0 
T t) The NN schedule describes the combination of 
q and q 
8. Edwards, S. and Aoki, M. (1983) Oil Export Boom and 
Dutch 
disease, Resource and Energy-, Vol. 5 219-242. This analysis 
is based on their work. 
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a qj( PO/PýN) q0 
that is compatible with equilibria in the non-traded goods 
market. The slope of this curve is given by 
d 
qT 
(d 
N 
/d 
y 
)b 
< d [(d /d + (d /d )H61 
qO N qT NyT 
The ray OT, on the other hand, measures the relative price 
of both tradeable goods - traditional tradeables to oil 
(P. T/P o) 
The initial equilibrium position is given by A 
00 
with equilibrium relative prices being equal to q, and cj[,, 
respectively. Consequently, in the event of an exogenous 
increase in the price of oil, the OT ray will then rotate 
clockwise toward OTI, as in figure 5.2. If the (nominal) 
price of non-tradeables was constant, the new equilibrium 
would be given by B, with a constant relative price of 
traditional tradeables with respect to non-tradeables. 
long as the slope of the NN is different from 0, at B 
there will be an excess demand for non-tradeables that 
will require an increase of the relative price of these 
goods, both with respect to the price of oil and 
traditional tradeables with a final equilibrium at 
As 
Therefore, an increase in the price of oil has resulted in 
a decrease in the relative price of traditional tradeables 
both with respect to oil (i. e; P T'P'o' < 
PT /PO) and with 
respect to non-tradeables (i. e. 
0 >q'). Because of this qT T 
reduction in the relative price of traditional tradeables, 
resources will then be encouraged to move out of 
the 
traditional tradeables sector (i. e agriculture in the 
Nigerian case) into the other sectors of the economy 
the resource movement effect". This has also 
been termed 
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the de-industrialization effect of an export boom. 
It is, however, important to notice that the extent 
of reduction of q T(: --P'T/PN' will depend on the slope of the 
NN curve. If the NN curve is a vertical line, the 
negative effect on qT of an exogenous increase in the 
price of oil will be maximum, while there will be no 
effect if the NN curve is a horizontal line. This 
situation would result if all the additional income earned 
from higher oil prices is spent on tradeables. 
Alternatively, suppose for example, that government 
spending were cut, and the naira devalued, two things are 
likely. One, the rate of money supply would decrease and 
inflation would slow down, and the real exchange rate 
would tend to depreciate. The signals to investors and 
wage earners would tend to reverse themselves, leading to 
more resources flowing into non-oil traded goods sector. 
Figure 5.2: An exogenous increase in the price of oil. 
KI 
qT 
.0 qT 
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5.3 The Resource movement effect theorv: - In an attempt 
to probe further into the resource movement effect we use 
the Salter (1959) model as explained by Corden and Neary. 9 
The central theme of the resource movement effect is that 
the boom in the energy sector raises the price of the 
marginal products of the mobile factors employed there 
(such as labour), and so draws resource out of the lagging 
sector (i. e agriculture) This results to various 
adjustments being made in the economy, one such adjustment 
being the real exchange rate. 
We begin our analysis by assuming a pre-boom 
equilibrium condition of point U in figures 5.3. Figure 
5.3 represents the labour market, with the wage rate 
measured on the vertical axis and the total labour supply 
given by the horizontal axis 0S 0' T' The 
input of labour 
into the non-traded goods sector is measured by the 
distance from 0S and the distance from 0T measures labour 
inputs into the two traded goods sectors. We assume here 
that the demand for labour in each sector is a decreasing 
function of the wage rate relative to the price of that 
sector's output. Thus LA represents the labour demand 
schedule for agriculture and by including the 
initial 
labour demand schedule for the oil sector give us LV 
9. Cordon and Neary, (1982), Op. cit. The analysis 
in this 
section is based on their article. 
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which is the sum total of the pre-boom labour demand 
schedule for both traded goods sectors combined. Also, LS 
is the initial labour demand schedule for the service 
sector, drawn for the initial price of output. Initial 
full-employment equilibrium is at U, where Lt intersects 
LS, and so the initial wage rate is Wo. 
Consequently, an increase in the price of oil, will 
shift upwards the labour demand schedule in the oil and 
service sectors (less in the oil than the service sector 
due to the capital intensity of the oil sector ) raising 
profitability and the demand for labour at a given wage 
rate. Equally, the composite labour demand schedule Lt 
shifted upwords to LI giving a new equilibrium at V. T 
However, we assume here that the initial real exchange 
rate is held constant, and later will be allowed to vary 
to bring back equilibrium in the market. The attainment 
of a new equilibrium at V would mean resources being 
reallocated in favour of non-tradeables and with 
government spending concentrated in urban centres, wage 
rates are raise to W1 at a constant real exchange rate. 
Labour which is a mobile factor, moves out of agriculture 
in the face of declining income which resulted to rural- 
urban labour migration. Hence employment in agriculture 
I 
fell from 0 
TA 
to 0 
TA 
therefore affecting agricultural 
output. It could then be said that the resource movement 
effect gave rise to direct de-Agriculturalisation. 
10 
10. Cordon, W. M. (1984) Booming sector and Dutch Disease 
Economics: survey and consolidation, Oxford Economic Papers 
36 359-380. 
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Figure 5.3: Effect of the boom on the labour market 
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However, to provide a complete picture of the Dutch 
disease model we must also incorporate the spending effect 
engendered by the boom. 
5.4 The Spendinq Effect: - The theory behind the spending 
effect is that an increase in the price of oil, will 
affect both the supply and the demand for money. Since 
the increase in oil prices gives rise to an initial 
balance of payments surplus, money supply also increases, 
particularly if the revenue so generated leads to 
increased government expenditure at home. If we assume 
here that the capital account is closed, then the 
increased supply of money would result in an increased 
demand for both traded and non-traded goods. This is in 
accordance with the Walras' Law which states that given n 
markets, if n-1 markets are in equilibrium then the last 
one must also be in equilibrium, because there can not be 
a net excess of demand or supply for all goods (including 
money). This gave rise to the overshooting of the nominal 
price of agricultural products beyond their long-run 
equilibrium. This phenomenon combined with the resource 
movement effect resulted in a loss of competitiveness in 
agriculture which is measured in this case by the decrease 
of qT. Formalizing the discussion, the increased supply 
of money in nominal terms (M' 
E) is presented as follows; 
ME -ms-mD.......................... 
(5.3) 
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c 
where Wj is the nominal (inflation related) supply of 
money, and MDs the demand for money in nominal terms. 
Expressing the demand for money MD as a function of real 
income and the price level, we can then write M 
Tý 
as 
MýE ME (M 
sIP. 
(5.31) N' PTfy)************ 
where PN is the price of non-traded and PT the price of 
traded goods, and Y is income. 
If we assume that NF is equal to zero only in the long- 
run( since the increase in Ms will in the short-run result 
to excess supply of money which will in turn be slowly 
eliminated through the balance of payments) again 
according to Walras Law, an excess supply of money will be 
reflected in an excess demand for non-tradeables and an 
excess demand for traditional tradeables. We therefore, 
have to modify equation (5.1) to incorporate the fact that 
in the short-run, an excess supply of money will be 
translated into an excess demand for goods and services. 
q, T'm'E 
Y) ................ 
(5.1") 
(+) (+) (+) 
Coming back to figure 5.1, an increase in ME will 
shift downward the NN schedule( movement left the NN 
curve) and we can therefore complete the model 
by 
specifying the balance of trade and the money supply 
equations. We define balance of trade 
here as; 
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B=P0o-pTET*******, *, * (5.4) 
where Et stands for excess demand for traditional 
tradeables, and 0 is the amount of oil exported. We also 
assumed here that dB /dP 
0 
>0; that is, that the increase 
in the price of oil results to an initial improvement in 
the balance of trade. Again it is assumed that an 
increase in the price of oil will result in a short-run 
excess supply of money. This is because, as Harberqer" 
has argued, an increase in P0 will result (through 5.4 
in a balance of trade surplus, and this, in turn, will 
positively affect the supply of money. 12 If we assume that 
this increase in M, S is greater than the increase in MD 
resulting from the income and price effects, this will 
result in excess supply of money which will be slowly 
eliminated through the trade account. On the other hand, 
if the capital account is assumed to be open, this excess 
11. Harberger, A. C. (1983)'Dutch disease- How much sickness, 
how much boon? 'Research and Enerqv, 5 pp. 1-20. 
12. In order to simplify the discussion we are assuming a 
closed Capital account. This is the case of most 
developing countries whose exchange controls do not allow 
for free capital mobility. But in the case of Nigeria, ME 
disappeared quicker because the laws were relaxed. 
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supply of money will be eliminated very quickly. 13 Under 
this assumption, the short-run effects of exogenous 
increase in the price of oil is depicted in fig. 5.4. 
The exogenous increase quickly resulted in a downward 
shift of the NN curve to N' N' (as a consequence of the 
excess supply of money), and in a rotation of the OT ratio 
to Gý . The NN curve shifted downward because of the 
excess demand for goods that accompanied the excess supply 
of money, with the new short-run equilibrium at s. and 
final equilibrium attained at c. 
The dynamics are characterized by shifts of the N' N' 
curve to the right towards the NN curve. The speed of 
this adjustment depends on how fast the excess supply of 
money is eliminated. As could be seen, the relative price 
of traditional tradeables undershoots its final 
equilibrium level. This meant that in this particular 
case, the loss of competitiveness of the trad1t1onal 
tradeables sector (as measured by the decline of q T) was 
greater in the short-run than in the long-run. 
Recall that previously we mentioned that the oil sector's 
use of labour is negligible; that 
is, it is capital 
intensive. On the basis of this assumption, at the 
initial real exchange rate the boom had little or no 
13. This was typical of Nigeria in the 1970s 
because of 
illegal transfers abroad. 
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effect on the oil sectors labour demand in figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.4: The short-run effect of an exogenous increase 
in the price of oil. 
TW T/Pn) 
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But the service sector's labour demand schedule shifts 
upward to LIS because of the rise in the price of 
services, hence a final equilibrium at point G in Figure 
5.3. As a result the wage rises still further to W2 (and 
drawing more labour) , which reduces agricultural 
employment from OTA to OTAII. Therefore, the boom gave 
rise to both direct de-agriculturalization, shown by the 
fall in agriculture employment from OTA to OTAI, and now 
also to indirect de-agriculturalization, shown in the 
additional fall to OTAII. While the former was as a result 
of the resource movement effect alone,, 14 the latter was as 
a result of the real appreciation due both to reduced 
output of agriculture (at the initial real exchange rate) 
because of the resource movement effects, and from 
increased demand for services because of the spending 
effects. 
5.5 Why Treat the Disease? 
Some economic commentators may question why the 
Dutch disease should be termed a disease. After all, it 
14. Movement of labour out of agricultural employment may 
not necessarily lead to a decline in output because of the 
application of technology. But in the case of Nigeria, 
output fell following movement of labour due to lack of 
technology to replace human labour. 
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could be argued that a shift in relative prices or in the 
"domestic terms of trade" in most cases favours certain 
sectors of the economy at the expense of others. If, 
however, such a shift favoured the oil sector against 
agriculture, as in the case of Nigeria, there is no 
rationale in calling the phenomenon a disease; rather it 
is a normal economic mechanism. our view is that if a 
sector of the economy squeezes other sectors so much so 
that the squeeze results in a decline in output, such a 
phenomenon is a disease and should be treated. This is 
particularly serious if the resource is an exhaustible 
one. Similarly, if the resource is to be short lived as 
is the case of petroleum in Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico and 
so forth, there is a great and urgent need for 
diversification into a more broadly based and sustainable 
economic development for when the resource eventually runs 
out. In Nigeria, for example, the last barrel of oil 
would be produced in 25 years' time at the current rate of 
production. 15 Even if the export resource boom is expected 
to last for a very long time, the government of the day 
may still need to diversify, especially if the resource is 
capital intensive (as in the case of petroleum) and has no 
prospect of providing substantial employment. Whatever 
the arguments about making the most of the booming sector 
15. Anyadike, N. (1985), 'Nigeria -A future without 
oil'West Africa, 26 August p. 1745. 
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and using the income as a transfer payment, most 
governments see employment as an end in itself and 
therefore would find it extremely difficult to see 
unemployment rising. Governments placing a high premium 
on equity will also find it tempting to protect the 
lagging sector, which is likely to employ a large share of 
low-income earners, especially in small-scale farming and 
labour-intensive manufacturing. A more compelling reason 
why the lagging sector must be protected in the case of 
Nigeria is that since Nigeria is a rural economy, any 
temporary halt in the growth of the agricultural sector 
could delay the "learning by doing experience"16 that 
would improve the comparative advantage ( or lessen a 
comparative disadvantage) in that sector. 
16. Wijnbergen, S. V. (1984) 'The Dutch disease: A 
disease 
after all. ' Economic Journal, 94 
March pp. 41-55. 
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6. THE DUTCH DISEASE SYNDROME AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
POLICIES: EFFECTS ON THE MACRO-ECONOMY OF NIGERIA. 
6.1 Introduction 
Dutch disease implies that the exchange rate has 
risen as a result of a new natural resource which greatly 
augments the country's oreign exchange earnings. As will 
be discussed in this chapter, a large inflow of foreign 
exchange (and large balance of payments surplus in most 
oil exporting countries), causes the domestic currency to 
appreciate, and the oil based rate to be higher than 
desirable for the non-oil sectors, with a harmful impact 
on the competitiveness of domestic production and to the 
objective of diversification. Oil greatly raised the value 
of Nigeria's currency, the naira, between 1973 and 1982. 
But before we examine the effect of this exchange rate 
appreciation, we shall briefly define what an exchange 
rate is - 
A nominal exchange rate is the price of one currency 
in terms of another. For example, it is the price of naira 
in terms of the U. S. dollar (and other convertible 
currencies). 
The value of the Nigerian naira has been very 
high since 
the early 1970s, partly also because of 
the vast sum of 
capital which flowed 
into the country from abroad. This 
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was attracted by the improved prospects for the balance of 
payments particularly after the 1973/74 oil price 
increases. The increased demand for oil created a direct 
benefit to the current account, to the extent that the 
output of oil increased exports, which in turn resulted in 
current account surpluses. The exchange rate, however, is 
assumed to move upwards to maintain equilibrium on the 
capital and current account of the balance of payments. 
The mechanism of this process is represented in Figure 
6.1. 
Figure 6.1: The mechanism of exchange rate adjustments. 
Naira price of 
tradeables and 
non-tradeables 
in terms of dollar 
Pl 
PC) 
P2 
Y- 
q4 q3 qO q2 Quantity of exports and 'imports 
In Figure 6.1, we label the naira price of tradeable 
goods relative to non-tradeable goods 
in terms of U. S. 
dollar on the vertical axis and the quantity of exports 
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and imports on the horizontal axis. 
The curves X,, X 1 are the export supply curves while M 
and 1ý are the import demand curves. The initial 
equilibrium A, represents the relative price P0 and 
quantity q0 of imports and exports. However, should the 
position change, e. g. the exports supply curve shifts to 
the right, either the exchange rate would change to change 
the price of tradeables (Pt = Pw/e where Pt is the foreign 
price of tradeables, P the world price of tradeables and W 
e the exchange rate). At P1 with the valued exports 
exceeding imports, the exchange rate would tend to rise, 
bringing down the foreign price of tradeables P t* 
"or 
domestic inflation would change the price of non- 
tradeables while the price of tradeables is held constant 
at world prices"'. Also in PI domestic non-tradeable 
prices would increase until the supply curve P0 was 
reached. But our main concern here is to show that the 
exchange rate would move to adjust the trade balance. 
Increased oil exports would move the export supply curve 
from X to X and the horizontal distance X -X represents 0110 
the increase in oil exports at a given rate of exchange. 
However, we are in this case assuming Pb to be constant. 
The movement of X0 to X, gives a new equilibrium at P2q,, 
where both total exports and imports are larger, the 
relative price ratio is smaller (and the dollar value of 
1. Atkinson, F. and Hall, S. (1983) Op. cit. p. 
S4. 
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naira is lower). Exports, apart from oil, would have 
fallen. Previously, exports were qo but with the oil 
resource and a price ratio P2, the non-oil exports falls 
to q3. "So there has been a rise in the exchange rate 
causing a decline in the level of non-oil exports and a 
rise in the level of imports, 12. This process of a fall in 
the exports of non-oil sector is termed the Dutch 
disease. 
6.2 How the exchanqe rate is determined in Nigeria. 
In Nigeria, the exchange rate policy during the 
late 1970s and 1980s was mainly used to dampen domestic 
inflationary pressures. It is not a freely floating rate 
like the sterling or the U. S. Dollar, but it fixed 
administratively by the Central Bank. In the early years 
after the first oil price rise, the Central Bank was happy 
to let it rise in line with market forces. With the vast 
accumulation of foreign reserves, Nigeria's more or less 
fixed exchange rate policy was managed through reserve 
intervention. Thus, if privately generated foreign 
exchange was less than that demanded for current 
transactions at the going official rate, private excess 
demand was satisfied by official reserve depletion. But 
when the price of oil started to fall 
in the early 1980's 
and with it foreign exchange earnings, 
the Bank should 
have devalued the currency, but was unwilling to 
do so 
Ibid, P. 85. 
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because of the effect which that would have had on import 
prices. Instead it resorted to rationing of foreign 
exchange via an import licensing system designed to 
protect official reserves. 
At the point in time when the value of naira was rising 
due to increased crude oil exports, the naira may not be 
described as overvalued in the real sense of the word, but 
the naira became overvalued when, as a result of falling 
exports and rising imports the Government (i. e. the 
Central Bank of Nigeria) neither allowed the naira to fall 
in value on a free market nor devalued it. 
Taking the nominal value of naira against the U. S. dollar, 
the naira may not have appreciated very much. But when 
that is converted into changes in the real exchange rate 
by taking account of the relative changes of export and 
import prices, the appreciation proves to have been 
substantial. Table 6.1 shows the consumer price indices 
in Nigeria and her major trading partners from 1970 to 
1984. Table 6.1 reveals that right from 1976, Nigeria's 
domestic price level has consistently risen more than that 
of her trading partners. Taking into account changes in 
prices we define an effective or real exchange rate as a 
weighted average of the exchange rates between Nigeria's 
domestic currency and the currency of her most important 
trading partners, with weights given by the relative value 
of Nigeria's trade with each of these trade partners. 
Similarly, the exchange rate movements in real terms 
against the currencies of Nigeria's trading partners can 
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Table 6.1 
Consumer Price Index in Nigeria and Her Major 
Trading Partners (1975=100) 
Nigeria U. S. U. K. Netherlands Japan 
1970 52.8 72.1 54.2 66.0 58.0 
1971 61.3 75.2 59.3 70.9 61.6 
1972 62.9 77.7 63.6 76.5 64.3 
1973 66.5 82.6 69.4 82.6 71.9 
1974 74.8 91.6 80.5 90.5 89.4 
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1976 124.3 105.8 116.5 108.8 109.3 
1977 148.3 112.7 135.0 115.8 118.1 
1978 176.0 121.2 146.2 120.5 122.6 
1979 195.6 134.9 165.8 125.6 127.0 
1980 215.9 153.1 195.6 133.8 137.2 
1981 260.8 169.0 218.9 142.7 143.9 
1982 280.9 179.5 237.7 151.1 147.6 
1983 346.1 185.2 248.6 155.3 150.2 
1984 483.2 193.2 261.0 160.4 153.6 
Source: International Financial Statistics Year-Book, 1985. 
83 
be accomplished by constructing an index of the real 
exchange rate with respect to a basket of currencies of 
those countries taking into account their rates of 
inf lation. 
6.3. Measurement of Real Exchange Rate in Nigeria. 
There are many ways of computing a real exchange 
rate. One exhaustive study by Pinto, (1985)3 presents no 
fewer than five different measures for Nigeria. For the 
sake of simplicity we shall use the figures produced by 
the World Bank. Table 6.2 shows that from the purchasing 
power parity point of view, the real effective exchange 
rate in which the relative rates of inflation in Nigeria 
and its principal trading partners are taken into account 
appreciated by 87 percent in the period 1973-81, 
reflecting the higher rate of inflation in Nigeria than in 
the economies of its trading partners. During the period 
1976-81 the appreciation was 30 percent - an 8 percent 
appreciation in 1976-77, a depreciation of 5 percent in 
1978 and a 26 percent appreciation between January 1979 
and December 1981.4 Another World Bank5 estimate puts 
3. Pinto, B. (1985), Nicreria durinq and after the oil boom: A policy 
comparison with Indonesia. World Bank publication october. 
4. World Bank, (1983) Nigeria- Macro Economic Policies for 
structural change, Report No. 4506-UNI August 15, Unpublished. 
5. World Bank Research News Vol. 7 No. 1 summer 1986 
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the appreciation to 1984 at 187 percent. The two are not 
stricting speaking comparable, but both indicate a 
sizeable appreciation. It is however, important to point 
out here that the nominal value of the naira remained 
unchanged at 0.72 naira to U. S. $1.00 from 1960-1972. 
Solong as the export proceeds from oil continued to 
increase, Nigeria had no problem in paying for the 
increasing volume of imports engendered by the high rate 
of exchange. But in the early 1980s, Nigeria's oil revenue 
started to fall and the high exchange rate could be 
maintained only by increased borrowing and by ever 
stricter import controls. Even when oil revenues were high 
and rising, Nigeria incurred a balance of trade deficit 
because all the world was willing to lend to her 
(especially in support of investment projects from which 
foreign contractors stood to benefit by the sale of their 
equipment), Nigeria was only too willing to borrow 
whatever anyone was willing to lend her. Then, when oil 
revenue started to decline, foreign lending ceased 
abruptly and Nigeria faced a very serious shortage of 
foreign exchange at what had now become a grossly 
overvalued currency. All this will be more fully discussed 
in chapter 8. The high value of the naira has affected 
Nigeria in the following ways: First, it has resulted in 
increased imports (even though the government has 
frequently imposed import bans on particular items). 
Secondly, it has caused agricultural exports to fall. 
Thirdly it has had other socio-economic effects. 
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6.4 Effects on Imports: - 
A high rate of exchange makes imports of all kinds cheaper 
than they would otherwise be. Partly for that reason food 
imports rose dramatically. For example, the importation of 
rice rose from 35 thousand metric tons in 1970 to 7 
million metric tons in 1975 and 313 million metric tons in 
1983. On average, rice imports showed an annual growth 
rate of 231 percent between 1970-75,248 percent between 
1975-80 and 15 percent between 1980-83 respectively( see 
Table 6.3 ). 
In 1984 the Federal Military Government issued import 
licences worth N2 billion for food items. Among them rice 
alone took N121 m between January and September, milk N55 
m, vegetable oil N42 m, sugar N27 m, wheat N6 m, fish N15 
m,, salt N9 m, baby food N3 m and tomatoe paste N1 m. 
Similarly out of about one million tonnes of palm oil 
consumed in Nigeria in 1984, domestic production accounted 
for only 710,000 tonnes. The remaining 300,000 tonnes were 
imported, a third of it from Malaysia. This is the more 
remarkable since palm oil was once Nigeria's principal 
export. Also in 1984, the United States alone exported 
1,540,000 metric tonnes of wheat grains worth $245 m to 
Nigeria. Wheat imports showed an average annual growth 
rate of 208 percent between 1970-75,9 percent between 
1975-80 and 3 percent between 1980-83. Vegetable oil 
imports showed an average annual growth rate of 151 
percent between 1970-75,322 percent 
between 1975-80 and 
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156 percent between 1980-8. Maize imports showed an 
average annual growth rate of 130 percent between 1970-75, 
127 percent between 1975-80 and 53 percent between 1980- 
83. 
Table 6.3 reveals that up to 1969 Nigeria did not import 
any rice, vegetable oil, maize or wheat. She was 
essentially self-sufficient in food, though what was eaten 
was predominantly yams, cassava, cocoyams and only fairly 
small quantities of rice were grown as this was not part 
of the staple diet. In the case of vegetable oil, she not 
only produced enough palm and groundnut oil, but was also 
a major exporter of these. After 1973, when oil exports 
had begun to shoot up, food came to be imported in 
increasing quantities, as we have seen in Table 6.3. 
The reliance on one export commodity, oil, which came to 
account for more than 95 per cent of export earning made 
Nigeria very vulnerable, the more so as had become so 
dependent upon imported food. The traditional foods - 
yams, cassava, ococyams and millet - have, of course 
continued to be grown, but only for self-consumption by 
farm households. The imported food has gone principally to 
feed the rapidly growing urban populations. Farmers who 
had once grown surplus food to sell to the towns have 
stopped doing so in the face of competition from cheap 
imported food. This is a very serious matter. 
Statistics of non-marketed food production in Third World 
countries are notoriously unreliable, but the evidence 
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suggests that in the face of population increasing by 
about 3%a year, food prodution may actually have 
declined by 2%a year. This decline has been both cause 
and effect of the large volume of food imports which, in 
turn, is directly attributable to the high exchange rate. 
6.5 Effects on Aqricultural Exports. 
At the same time that imports increased, the export of 
Nigeria's staple agricultural products declined apparently 
almost to vanishing point, having become uncompetitive at 
the high exchange rate. We shall argue that high exchange 
rate has been an important contributary factor in the 
decline of agricultural exports and of agricultural 
production as a whole. 
First, the exchange rate determines how much in local 
currency a farmer receives for his exports. Therefore the 
higher the exchange rate the less a he receives in local 
currency. Take for example, the Marketing Board sells her 
purchases at an appreciated naira therefore earns less 
than it would otherwise have earned. On top of her reduced 
earning, she also has to make the following deductions; 
wages for its large number of staff, export taxes paid to 
the Government and reserves for its stabilization 
policy(see discussion on Marketing Board's activities 
below). All these contribute to much less of the Board's 
income being paid to farmers in form of prices as Table 
6.4 shows. The figures in Table 6.4 represent the prices 
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Table 6.4 -- Nigeria - Value Received By Farmers For Crops They Produce 
For Export, 1960-1977 
Percent of Sales Realization by Farms by Crops: 
Year Cotton Cocoa Groundnuts Palm Oil Palm Kernel 
1960-1961 25 62 54 63 47 
1961-1962 20 52 58 59 60 
1962-1963 18 59 51 53 54 
1963-1964 19 57 48 54 48 
1964-1965 21 89 48 48 46 
1965-1966 21 51 47 45 45 
1966-1967 23 45 50 54 51 
1967-1968 24 43 46 55 48 
1968-1969 27 38 41 91 45 
1969-1970 32 45 40 91 51 
1970-1971 36 50 37 49 52 
1971-1972 46 62 37 56 74 
1972-1973 43 58 35 - 41 
1973-1974 - 50 - - 40 
1974-1975 - 63 - - 52 
1975-1976 - 72 - - 150 
1976-1977 - 66 - - 130 
Note: (-) indicates that foreign exports ceased from those years. 
Source: Bates, R. H. (1981), Markets and States in Tropical Africa, 
University of California Press) pp. 137-145. 
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offered to domestic producers expressed as a percent of 
the f. o. b. price at Lagos, Port Harcourt or Warri ports. 
In some cases, the figures show that the producers have 
almost invariably received a price lower than the world 
market price6. Bates noted that; " in most instances, they 
obtain less than two-thirds of the potential sales 
realization, and in many cases they received less than 
one-half, 17. Consequently, the above policies have affected 
farmers' incentives to produce for export. Alternatively, 
if more favourable prices obtain in neighbouring countries 
they may continue to produce export crops, but smuggle 
them across the border. 8 This has clearly happened. 
Exports may therefore not have declined quite as 
dramatically as the official statistics seem to indicate. 
Secondly, as was mentioned above, a highly valued currency 
makes food imports cheap which is not favourable for 
domestic food producers therefore output declines. 
6. Bates, R. H. (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa_L 
University of california press. 
7. Bates, (1981), p. 29. 
8. Cleaver, K. M. (1985) 'The impact of price and Exchange rate 
policies on Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa', World Bank Staff 
Working Papers, No. 728. Also Rimmer, D. (1984) The Economies of west 
Africa, International Economies Series. 
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The effects of the high exchange rate becomes clearer when 
we examine Table 6.5. Table 6.5 Column 2 shows the average 
total domestic cost of production per tonne of each crop, 
Column 3 shows the c. i. f cost of imports into Nigeria and 
Column 4 shows the difference between total domestic cost 
and cost of imports. As Table 6.5 shows, it is far cheaper 
to import the various items than to produce them in 
Nigeria due to high exchange rate. This situation brought 
about increases in imports. Farmers became better off 
trading imported food stuffs than actually producing them. 
But as Column 5 suggests, if the exchange rate were 
devalued to NO. 813 = $1.00 (a devaluation of 30 per cent) 
the entire picture changes. It would then becomes cheaper 
to produce domestically than to import as Column 6 
suggests. 
However, as the evidence on Table 6.5 suggests, exchange 
rate alone cannot be blamed for Nigeria's agricultural 
decline. Another reason for this is the activities of the 
Marketing Boards. 
6.6 State Marketing Boards and their functions: - 
Marketing Boards are trading agencies established by 
governments to control the marketing of primary and 
processed agricultural commodities. They act as 
monopsonies. 
9 
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Prior to the establishment of the West African Produce 
Control Board following the recommendations made by the 
Nowell Commission, 10 commodity marketing of West Africa's 
export crops was undertaken by private traders. Large 
enterprises like the United Africa Company (general 
merchants) and more specialized dealers and processing 
manufacturers such as the British Cotton Growing 
Association (cotton growers) and Cadbury Bros. (cocoa 
manufacturers) maintained extensive buying stations, using 
local brokers or middlemen, as they were called, to 
collect small loads and to settle cash payments with 
producers. In 1937 the price of cocoa fell to a very low 
level so much so that the farmers and the big foreign 
firms were badly affected financially. The immediate 
reaction of the big export companies was that they evolved 
an agreement among themselves on the regulation of the 
export trade, especially through the prices paid to 
farmers. The farmers reacted by refusing to sell their 
9. Bates, R. H. (1985) Markets and States in Tropical Africa, 
University of California press. 
10. Bauer, P. T. (1964) West African Trade,. London: Rout ledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
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cocoa to these firms. They also organised a boycott of 
imported goods. To avoid a complete dislocation of the 
export and import trade, the British Government appointed 
the Nowell Commission to examine the problem. The 
commission's report was published in 1938. Based on this 
report, the West African Produce control Board was set up. 
It was to be responsible for the grading, purchase and 
sale of the crops exported by Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone 
and Gambia. The Control Board paid lower prices to West 
African farmers than it received from the world market. 
The difference between what it received and what it paid 
to farmers was kept as a reserve. 
In Nigeria, the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was 
established in 1947. The Nigerian Groundnut Marketing 
Board and the Nigerian Cotton Marketing Board were 
established in 1949 while the Nigerian Oil Palm Produce 
Marketing Board was established in 1950. These were known 
as commodity marketing boards and each of them, through 
licensed buying agents( who were paid commissions for 
their services) was to arrange the purchase and marketing 
of a particular product for the whole country. In 1954, 
there were consitutional changes which gave more powers to 
the three regional governments in Nigeria. The result was 
that the existing commodity marketing boards were replaced 
by four regional marketing boards. These were the Northern 
Regional Marketing Board which handled all the cocoa, 
benniseed, cotton, soya beans and groundnuts in the North, 
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the Eastern Regional Marketing Board which dealt with the 
copra, soya beans, palm oil and kernel from the then 
Eastern region and the Western Regional Marketing Board 
which organised the purchase and sale of all the cocoa, 
palm oil, palm kernels, coffee, cotton and other products 
from the West. 
The Boards fixed prices at which the various grades of 
cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel, cotton, groundnuts, etc 
would be bought by their licensed buying agents. They are 
fixed at the beginning of the season so that farmers know 
in advance what they can expect to be paid for their 
crops. The prices thus announced are usually maintained 
throughout the season. The Boards will cut the link 
between the price of cocoa in West Af rica and the day to 
day price in the world market. Accordingly, in some 
seasons when world market prices are high, the price paid 
to the producers will be less than the average realisation 
on overseas sales. The Boards will, on such occasions, 
show a 'surplus'. There will however be other seasons 
in 
which the average world price is below the price paid to 
producers. On these ocassions the Boards will make a 
'loss', which will be financed from the 'surpluses' which 
accrued in years of high world prices. The 
intention was 
that 'profit' should be utilized primarily to maintain the 
maximum possible stability 
in the price paid to the 
producer. 
" In practice, the marketing boards have 
largely 
-------------------- 
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failed to carry out this stabilization function and, have 
almost invariably paid growers less than the world market 
price warranted. As a result, they have accumulated large 
surpluses or reserves. These reserves really constitute a 
kind of indirect taxation of the producers of the exported 
farm products, especially when they have been diverted to 
public developments outside the agricultural sector from 
which they were obtained, as has often been the case. 
By using the available market power at their disposal, the 
Marketing Boards keep the prices paid to the farmers 
constantly below world market prices and below free market 
determined domestic open market prices as shown in Table 
6.5 . As can be observed from Table 6.5, Column 1 is 
constantly below Column 7. These undesirable circumstances 
resulted in decreased production for export as Table 6.6 
shows. From 1973, export products like groundnuts 
gradually disappeared from the Nigerian export Table. Palm 
oil disappeared from 1972 . Cotton disappeared 
in 1974, 
while the volume of cocoa and palm kernel, the only 
Nigerian exports apart from petroleum, have been 
fluctuating and showed a real declined since 1980 for 
cocoa and 1978 for palm kernels. 
Equally striking is the pricing Policy adopted by the 
0 
government itself. As well as paying farmers producer 
11. Baur, P. T. (1964) P. 269. 
98 
M 
00 
CIA 
110 
0 
E-4 
C) 
C: ) 
C) 
Z., 
co 
4) 
-T-4 
4-) 
. T-4 
licl 
0 
0 
0 
u 
ý4 
0 
. 1-1 
cli 
z 
4-4 
0 
4-3 
ý4 
0 
ca 
E-A 
r- 
ON 
r- 
1 00 
ON 
'. 4 
CYN 
I 
\. O 
rl_ 
Lr) 
I 
ON 
i 
CY) 
rl_ 
ON 
C14 
-. 4 
0 
r-_ 
CTý 
Lf) 
I'D 
CD 
%M 
c31% 
1 
--4 
"Ci 
C) 
0 
0 V) 
C14 
0 
C) 
01ý CD 
ý. o 
C31% 
0 
C) 
0 
CY) 
00 
0 
--4 
0 
00 
Lr) -4 
--4 C14 
0 
---i 
0 
C) 
0 
C) 
01, 
C 
CD 
-zr C) 
00 
Lr) 
--4 
C) 
CY) Lr) 
C71% --I I I 
Cý4 Lr) 
CD 
-4 
C) 
C14 00 00 -4, CD 
1 c4 Lr) - CD 
C14 
Cý4 
CIA 
0 
C311% C14 0 
r- 00 1 CD 
C14 C14 CY) 
CD 
Cý4 CD CY) CD C, 4 "D CD 
00 Lr) (n CD Lr) cn C: 5 Lr) --4 C31N 
Lr) 
CD 
"o CD Lr) ý, o C-4 "o 't 
--1 0 C14 00 O'ý C'4 I'D 
CY) 
I'D C: ) \D 0 00 -It 
--4 CD C4 C: ) CY% C14 
C") -, T C14 Lr) 
r-q 
>4 "Ci 0 rý 
cu 0 
0 4j 
L) 41 
0 
U 
99 
C14 
00 
C31S 
-. 4 
---I 00 
0 
00 
10 
C: ) 
CD 
CY) 
0 
ý-D 
0 
CD 
0 
Lr) 
--4 --4 
C 
--4 
0 
4-J 4-1 
: ý4 0 10 -0 r_: r--4 CIO ý:: r- 0 0 
0 z :3 4-1 ý4 
r--i C. ) 0 0 -W 4-j 
ca ca 0 ý4 W 0 a) 
04 P4 U U U U 44 
LO 
(n 
0 
-r4 
$-4 
E cz 
> 
0 4-1 
ý4 ý4 
4-1 0 
(3) Cý 
CL, (1) 
04 
4. J 
Cw r--i 
a) Cid 
u 
0) r. 
0 
to cl 
m ý4 
0 
4-j 
U 
U) Q) 
u P. 
. r-4 LO 
4-1 z 
U) ý-q 
-rý 
4-1 r= 
cli :ý 
41 Q) 
0 
4-4 ý4 
0 4-1 
(1) 
PL4 
u 
., A rz 
4-4 0 
4-4 $-4 
0 4-4 
10 C13 
0) 4-J 
'n 
4-1 ý4 
U) 
in. 44 
:: 3 
U) 
ýo 
ý4 0 
:: 3 ý4 
4-4 C1.4 
-4 C, 4 
Ln 
110 
Lr) 
r- 
CN 
--4 
Im -t 
(n 
cn 
CD 
CD 
CD 
0 
10 --4 
-0 
Co 
4-J 
0 
Co 
zi Lr) 
r. Im 
"0 
(L) 
4-1 
CD 
41 1.0 
ul Cl% 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD Lr) CD 
CD CD u-i c-, i 
Lr) 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD \m CD C, 4 
CD C: ) 
li rý 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD oo 0 ý, 0 
CD CD rq -t (N 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD ---i Ln 00 CD CD c-i t CN 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD - oo CD 
CD CD Lr) 0 M 
CD CD CD C-D CD 
CD CD m 0 - 
CD CD CO r- rn 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD 00 r- cq 
CD CD ý: t Co CY) 
cn 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD -t c rn CD CD -t Glý cn 
CD CD CD CD CD 
CD CD r- C 
CD CD C, 4 c 
-t C, 4 
CD CD CD 0 CD 
CD CD 00 -- CD"ý 
CD CD clq c Oý 
CD CD -t CD Co 
CD CD cy) CO 
CD CD clq 
Lr) OD 
CD CD CD c 
CD CD Lr) %c 
CD CD -4 c 
A A 
CN "0 
--i 
U. ' 
Co 
cu 
0 
(, 0 eý CU >4 pý U P-4 
JQO 
ca 
$- 
cu a) 
10 19-- Q) En 
rX4 
>ý% 'a 
Q) 
0 
cz 
Lr) 
00 
j 
4-J 
u :5 
. rq u 
4-1 rA ý4 
C14 w 
00 <ý 
1 00 -4 
r- C14 --4 -4 C14 cli 4-j 4-4 
tNo r- 0 
4-4 
0 ý4 
4-J 4-1 
ý: o 4-j m 
0 OC rl_ u rý 
ý4 Lr) . C: ) CY) (t C: 
OC) C: ) ý4 -H 
I + 4-1 x 
r--l C)IN En 
M 
ý4 
Q) 
-4 ca lu 0 (3) 
0 rX4 
-It Lr) 00 C14 Lr) 
ca 0 + + + + + 
ý4 "D ýa 
Q) (3'-% W 
> -4 
0 10 
ý-4 (U 
t4-4 
Itj 0. 
Q) 
U) 
co 
C) (01% ---4 CD --4 4. J - Qj 
C14 C C) 110 olý 110 'jo cn ýý 
00 C) Lf) cn 0 0 0) 
CT, 
w ý: 
W cz 
ý4 
(1) 
W :: I C'4 U to 
o - 0 C: ) C cyý -rý -H 
--4 C 00 CY) C) C4 1 4. J k" 
00 "t 00 U) 
01% r- -H 0) 
r--q Lfý (7*A 41 
r_ 
-4 CZ 4-J 
4-) 
$-4 cn 4-4 
0 0 
4-4 4-4 
C) C"4 o CD 0 0 4-) 
0 C I- C3, *% r- 00 U) En 
00 C 00 'T -4 (L) (3) 0) ý4 U ý4 
4-4 a) 
rX4 0 E-4 
1--, /1-1 
-4 
ca rý -rý m 
> 10 0 w 
LO ca 0 u 
Cl. w a) :: j F=: Dý 
0 C=- cn u 0 --1 ý: D $4 co co -r4 $4 co C 
C-) >-4 u ge. u P-4 V) 
prices lower than the world market prices, the government 
embarked on a budgetary consumer price subsidy (Col. 12 
Tables 6.5). This is done by making final retail prices of 
imported goods (Col. 11), substantially lower than 
economic retail prices of imported goods(col. 10), the 
domestic open market prices (Col. 7) and total domestic 
cost of production (Col. 2). In other words it is costing 
farmers far more to produce a tonne of goods at home than 
even the price at which the government is prepared to sell 
them. This situation was as a result of political 
pressures at home to make food cheap. The political 
pressures came from two main sources one of which is the 
urban dweller and the other is the employer who, when his 
employees are faced with the high cost of food, is forced 
to pay higher wages. The government itself, being a major 
employer in Nigeria (over 80 per cent of wage and salary 
employment is provided by the public sector) joins hands 
with workers and industry in seeking low cost food. 
The government's response to higher wage demands by its 
employees is not by way of wage increases but by way of 
reducing the cost of living, hence reducing the cost of 
food in particular. This situation 
was well illustrated by Bates when he wrote; 
Pricing policy finds its origins in the 
struggle between urban interests and their 
governments; and in the political 
reconciliation of that struggle, it is the 
rural producers who bear the costs; they are 
the ones who bear the burden of policies 
designed to lower the price of food"12 
-------------------- 
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Cheap food and the growth of population, as well as the 
growth in real income, have combined to cause domestic 
consumption to increase to an unprecedented level. While 
the average annual population growth rate 1960-83 was 3 
percent, Table 6.7 shows that the annual domestic 
production rate for yam declined by 9 percent, cassava by 
15 percent, rice by 11 percent, groundnuts by 10 percent 
and palm oil by 21 percent respectively. But for the high 
level of imports, Nigeria would now be very short of food 
indeed. 
6.7 Socio-Economic Effects: - 
As incentives to sell were eroded, farmers came to grow 
ever less for the market, though they continued to produce 
for self consumption. As a result the eating habits of 
those who had to buy their food started to change. Those 
who grow their own food continued to grow and eat the 
customary food crops like cassava and yams. Those who 
bought their food (mainly the city dwellers) have become 
accustomed to a totally different diet because what was 
imported was not cassava and yams but wheat and rice. 
People not only came to buy wheat and rice because they 
were cheaper, but also because they are easier 
to cook. 
Especially in an urban environment it is a great 
-------------------- 
12. Bates, R. H. Op. cit. p. 
35. 
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TABLE 6.8 : FERTILIZER IMPORTS IN NIGERIA 
Year Import Value Import Quantity 
(N. million) (10001MT) 
1970 1.6 34.1 
1971 1.8 52.0 
1972 4.0 83.0 
1973 3.1 84.4 
1974 6.1 83.7 
1975 12.3 150.6 
1976 20.4 207.8 
1977 58.7 298.2 
1978 58.1 315.7 
1979 67.5 339.9 
1980 108.1 423.1 
1981 317.5 1,044.5 
1982 393.9 1,3806 
Estimates 
Source: - 1970-76 International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development; Nigeria -An informal Survey Lagos. 
1977-82 Aribisala, T. S. B. (1983) Nigeria's Green Revolution: 
Achievement, problems and prospects; Nigerian Institute of 
Social and Economic Research Ibadan. 
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convenience to be able to buy wheat bread provided by a 
baker, especially if one only has a short break for lunch. 
So, with the duty on the imported rice reduced from 20 
percent to 10 per cent during the Obasanjo regime, and the 
total abandonment of import duties during the Shagari 
regime, demand shifted to foreign sources and imports 
surged. But a devaluation of, say, 30 per cent, would so 
increase the price of wheat and rice that it might cause 
people to go back to eating the locally produced 
traditional foodstuffs. 
This would restore farmers' incentive to produce for the 
market and might even cause some town dwellers to go back 
to farming. But this will take time. 
Another socio-economic consequence of the highly 
valued naira was its effects on the price of local farm 
inputs. It totally distorted the market mechanism to the 
disadvantage of the local farmer. 
Undoubtedly, the high value of the naira would result in 
imported inputs like fertilisers becoming cheaper to the 
farmers, but as we shall argue below, local farmers have 
not benefitted as much from these cheap imported 
fertilisers as many people would think. Table 6.1 shows 
Nigeria's fertiliser imports from 1970 to 1982. Quite 
apart from cheap imports due to the rate of exchange, the 
government also subsidises fertilisers directly at a 
relatively high level. Although the level of subsidy fell 
after 1978, it is still fairly high compared with some 
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Figure 6AL The Supply of Fertilizer Inputs 
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other African countries (see Figure 6.2). Similarly, 
assisted by the influx of revenue from oil, duties on all 
agricultural inputs including fertilisers were removed. 
But in practice, small-scale farmers often in remote 
areas, rarely obtain these inputs at the intended low 
prices. 
If they can buy them at all it is from middle men who 
sell them at much higher prices. The real beneficiaries of 
low priced inputs are the government owned large scale 
farms which are inefficient and represent only a tip-of- 
the-iceberg as far as farm production is concerned. Most 
(90 per cent) of the country's agricultural output comes 
from about 13 million small and medium scale farmers. 
This fact, a former agriculture minister, Bukar Shuaib, 
conceeded when he said: 
"No doubt, most of the state-owned 
institutions involved in agricultural and 
livestock development are making heavy 
losses, addiny 3 
little or no contribution to 
the economy". 
All this, despite the fact that unlike most of 
agriculture, the state-owned farms have the lion's share 
of the cheaply imported and subsidised fertilizers. 
In summarlsing this section therefore, it is evident 
that a high exchange rate does agriculture no good. 
Similarly, while currency depreciation will have a 
significant part to play in revitalising the non-oil 
13. Newswatch, Nov. 25,1985 
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export sectors of Nigeria, other factors like change in marketiný 
board policy resulting in higher producer prices are equally important. 
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7. 
-WHAT 
NIGERIA MIGHT HAVE DONE TO PROTECT HER 
AGRICULTURE. 
A large proportion of the revenue from mineral exports 
tend to accrue to the governments of the exporting 
country. A rational economic policy is therefore central 
in determining their ultimate benefits to the producing 
countries. This chapter looks at the economic policies 
that Nigeria might have pursued in order to ensure full 
protection of the agricultural sector. 
The analysis in chapter 6 showed that the Nigerian 
government over the years has got her oil policies wrong. 
With the benefit of hindsight therefore, we think that 
Nigeria would have done better had a more rational policy 
for protecting the lagging sector, agriculture, been 
adopted. However, whether or not a particular policy works 
will always depend to an extent on how it is applied. one 
can not therefore be certain that the following 
suggestions would in fact have worked. 
But perhaps the first solution for minimizing any 
disruptive effect of the rapidly growing revenue from oil 
exports should have been to sterilize part of it, by 
accumulating enough foreign reserve and enough investments 
abroad to prevent too much of the revenue from filtering 
into the domestic economy. By so doing, the government 
could have prevented the exchange rate from an excessive 
108 
appreciation. In this way, the government would have saved 
the lagging sector, agriculture, from being faced by an 
appreciated exchange rate. This would also have reduced 
any problem of absorptive capacity in other parts of the 
economy and been a safeguard against inflation. Reserve 
accumulation and sterilization is particularly 
appropriate when a boom is likely to be short- lived and/ 
or when export earnings are likely to be unstable. 
Examples of countries that adopted this policy are Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and most other Gulf countries. In 1981, for 
example, the estimated Saudi foreign assets amounted to 
between $160-$170 billion with an estimated return on 
investment of between $18-$20 billioni. The Saudis had 
good reason to do this since Saudi Arabia is much smaller 
than Nigeria and therefore correspondingly more at risk of 
overheating. But, as Roemer2 argued, the prospects for 
successful sterilization are not always very bright. In 
Africa, for example, and indeed most countries, a 
1. 
Fesharaki, F. and Isaak, D. T. (1986) Opec, the Gulf, and the 
World petroleum market p. 43. 
2. 
Roemer, M. (1983). Dutch disease in developing countries: 
Swallowinq bitter medicineZ. Harvard Institute 
for 
International Development, oct. p. 21. 
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Political party is elected to satisfy constituency demands 
and/or that of party supporters. It is therefore very 
difficult for any government to resist spending its way 
towards short-term political stability by using newly 
found export revenues, especially when the tenure of 
office tends to be measured in months rather than years. 
Revenue sterilization therefore, as argued by Roemer; 
requires a longer political horizon 
than many governments have, or feel 
they can afford. This short horizon 
also helps to explain why the seemingly 
more tractable problems of cyclical 
exports are almost as difficult to 
solve as those of the more sustained 
13 booms in products like oil and diamonds. 
Nigerian might still have avoided real exchange rate 
appreciation if she had adopted the following related 
policies. 
First, Nigeria could have maintained a dual exchange rate 
policy which pays an appreciated rate to the booming 
sector and a devalued rate to all other tradeables. This 
policy was very common among Latin American countries 
after the secnd World War as a way of protecting the non- 
traditional export and import substitution sectors. 
Nigeria could also have used the taxes levied on the oil 
export sector to subsidise the agricultural sector. The 
benefit of this would have been that the agricultural 
sector would probably have expanded and consequently 
3. Roemer, M. (1983) p. 21. 
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contributed to an increase in GDP. This might have left 
Nigeria with a buoyant agricultural sector as well as a 
booming oil sector. A typical example of this is Norway. 
The Norwegian government realising that the oil and gas 
revenues would not last forever, rightly decided to tax 
the oil sector, like a private sector, and then used the 
tax revenue to expand the manufacturing sector. By so 
doing, Norway today has both expanding oil and gas sectors 
and a healthy manufacturing sector. Although Nigeria like 
Norway did tax the oil sector heavily, she did not follow 
Norway's example of using the proceeds to support the 
lagging sector- in Nigeria's case, agriculture. Nigeria 
unlike Norway, spent her oil tax revenues on non- 
productive investments and imports of consumer goods. The 
only real way Nigeria could have minimized the Dutch 
disease syndrome would have been to pay more attention to 
the agricultural sector. This is because since more than 
70 percent of the entire population are non wage earners 
or live in the rural areas and depend on agriculture, the 
only means of transfering some of the oil wealth to such a 
large section of the population would have been through 
increased state expenditure on rural development and 
especally agriculture. If, at the same time, the 
Government had paid farmers much higher prices for their 
produce the unfortunate consequences of the export of oil 
for agriculture might have been avoided, as also the need 
to import food. 
However, there are some technical problems with 
ill 
subsidizing lagging sectors. One such problem is the 
question of whether or not factors of production ought to 
be subsidized. Atkinson and Hall have argued that 
subsidization of factors of production may simply mean 
supporting hidden unemployment and protecting industries 
from having to make painful but necessary structural 
adjustments. 
If the lagging sector is protected or subsidised, there 
may be a danger of it becoming increasingly inefficient. 5 
Also where there is a dearth of management and 
administrative capacities, payments of subsidies may be f 
mishandled. Similarly, the temptation to use subsidy 
schemes as political tools in developing countries abound. 
Subsidies might be given to political favourites at the 
expense of others, so that, the basis for allocation 
becomes one of political support rather than the 
production of goods and services. 
The fourth policy instrument is the use of an 
appropriate incomes policy. The government might have used 
an income policy to restrain the growth of wages and other 
forms of income. Wage restraint as a means of both 
4. 
Atkinson, F. and Hall, S. (1983) Oil and the British Economy; 
Croom Helm p. 106 
Atkinson and Hall (1983) p. 108. 
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employment creation and economic stabilization has been 
used at various times by most governments. The trouble is 
that such a policy will almost certainly not be welcomed 
by organized unions that represent important political 
forces. But Nigeria has been fortunate in not having 
strong and militant unions which would have made an 
incomes policy easier to apply. 
On the whole, Nigeria made poor use of her oil 
windfall. She did not necessarily consume all that she 
earned from oil. Much was invested but the investment was 
often in non-productive projects; such as the construction 
of new airports, a new capital city, etc, which did little 
to increase the supply of goods and services. one 
consequence of this increased spending was an acceleration 
of inflation. This could be held at bay so long as there 
was no balance of payments constraint on imports. once 
that ceased to be so because of the fall in the price of 
oil, inflation became a major problem. 
7.1 WHAT CAN NIGERIA DO NOW. 
In the face of decreasing oil revenues, Nigeria needs more 
than ever to pay particular attention to agriculture. This 
is because it is in agriculture that Nigeria has greater 
comparative advantage. As discussed above, 
this particular 
sector has suffered severely partly 
because the exchange 
rate was allowed to rise which 
decimated exports and 
farmers' incomes. Many abandoned farming and went 
to look 
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for work in the towns. A recovery in agricultural 
production should therefore form a major part of a general 
economic recovery programme. 
The Babangida government is in fact taking some steps in 
the right direction by providing a package of incentives 
for non-oil exports, including agriculture. Such 
incentives include; retention of 25 percent of the foreign 
exchange earnings, the establishment of free export zones 
in certain parts of the country, refund of import duty 
paid by exporters for raw materials imported into the 
country for their products, preference in import licence 
allocation, rebate of the mandatory 30 percent import levy 
on all imports so long as they are used to promote 
exports, and the establishment of export credit quarantee 
and insurance scheme. Alhough only some of these measures 
benefit farmers. To insure the success of this policy, the 
government has recently promulgated the export ( 
incentives and miscellaneous provisions) decree, 1986. 
Both indigenous and foreign owned companies are already 
bracing up for the challenge to earn Nigeria foreign 
exchange through exports. Big concerns like the United 
African Company, John Holt and Lever Brothers, have gone 
into large-scale mechanised agriculture. Volkswagen's 
subsidiary is rearing to start exporting its products to 
countries in the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) sub-region, SCOA Nigeria plans to export its 
Peugeot 404 pick-up vans and Inlaks Nigeria is nursing 
similar moves. None of this is of much help to small scale 
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agriculture where the majority of Nigerians earn their 
livelihood. For small farmers an important measure has 
been the recent abolition of the commodity Marketing 
Boards and a return to a free market in the buying and 
selling of most crops. This can be expected to provide 
farmers with a better return to efforts to increase 
production for sale. 
A devaluation policy is another option that the government 
should seriously consider. For details about devaluation 
and its likely effects on Nigeria's balance of payments 
see chapter 8. 
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8. THE AFTERMATH OF THE DUTCH DISEASE SYNDROME IN 
NIGERIA: - 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the likely effects of a 
currency devaluation. After assessing previous studies, 
it reports our own attempt at an empirical analysis. As a 
matter of fact, since this chapter was written, the naira 
has been greatly devalued, but it is as yet far too early 
to know what consequences will have ensued from the 
devaluation. 
The high exchange rate which initially resulted from 
the great increase in oil revenue, soon caused the balance 
of payments to deteriorate. This deterioration was the 
consequence of the high level of imports (government and 
individuals taking advantage of cheap imports due to the 
exchange rate appreciation), the erratic behaviour of oil 
exports and the decline in non-oil exports resulting from 
the exchange appreciation (see Table 8.1) . In 1978, the 
deficit on current account reached N2.4 billion which for 
the first time had to be financed by borrowing from the 
Eurodollar market on a large scale, as well as by drawing 
down foreign exchange reserves, the level of which fell 
below two months' imports. Thanks to the stabilization 
measures of 1978, imports declined, though only marginally 
in 1979, and increased oil exports (both in volume and 
price terms) helped to reverse the trend of declining 
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reserves. 1979, saw a sharp increase in the world market 
price of oil. By the end of 1979, the reserve level 
reached the equivalent of four and a half months of 
imports. Although the growth of imports was rather high 
at almost 23 percent in 1980, the current account was in 
surplus to the tune of N1.6 billion. The level of foreign 
exchange reserves stood at more than N5.1 billion (5.9 
months of imports) at the end of 1980. This was made 
possible by large drawings on previously committed loans 
as well as on new loan commitments. In 1981, export 
revenues declined rapidly, whereas imports of goods and 
non-factor services continued to grow, reaching nearly 
N13.8 billion. As a result, the current account incurred 
a deficit of more than N3.4 billion, which was financed 
mainly by drawing down foreign exchange reserves. The 
level of foreign exchange reserves declined to N3.2 
billion at the end of 1981 (equivalent of two months of 
iinports). Until 1978, Nigeria' recourse to external 
borrowing had been quite limited and the major part of 
Nigeria's external debt consisted of concessional 
borrowings. Although the balance of payments situation 
improved in 1979 and in 1980, Nigeria continued to borrow 
mostly for project financing by the state governments. 
' 
1. In Nigeria, at that time, individual state were free to borrow 
money abroad, as well as the Federal Government, for capital 
projects. 
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According to the World Bank, Nigeria's outstanding 
external debt rose to $12 billion by the end of 1981 and 
in 1983, it was $20 billion. By the end of 1983, interest 
payments on loans was seriously eroding the foreign 
reserve with about $1.1 billion per annum being spent on 
interest payments alone2. 
With the choking debts, the fall in foreign earnings, 
the refusal of foreign creditors to extend more loans and 
with the debt servicing accumulating, Nigeria was left 
with no other option but to go to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. This approach was 
first made in April 1983 for a balance of payments support 
loan of N1.9 billion to N2.4 billion under its extended 
fund facility (EFF) programme. 
In February 1984, the Minister of Finance, Dr. 
Onaolapo Soleye said that the loan was needed because of 
the disequilibrium in the nation's economy 
"caused by the vicissitudes of the international 
oil market which had a devastating impact on the 
nation's exportsjj3 
In response, the IMF placed devaluation, among other 
things, as the single most important item in their 
negotiation with Nigeria. This made the IMF very 
2. World Bank, (1985), World Debt Tables. 
3. Nigerian Tide, Saturday April 7 1984 p-5. 
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unpopular among Nigerian leaders. Both President Shehu 
Shagari's administration and the subsequent Military rule 
under Major General Mohammedu Buhari refused to budge on 
the issue of devaluation because of what they alleged to 
be the economic and social ramifications. In their view 
devaluation would not help Nigeria in any significant way, 
and their view was based on the findings of, amongst 
456 others, Osagie, Olayide and Olatunbosun, and Owosekun 
and Olayide. 7 Osagie estimated the price elasticities of 
Nigerian foreign trade and their response to exchange rate 
4. Osagie, E (1970) Price Elasticities in Niqerian foreign traae 
and Exchange rate flexibility Nigerian Institute of Social and 
Economic Research(NISER) University of Ibadan 1970. 
5. Olayide S. O. and Olatunbosun, D; An Econometric Analysis of 
Nigeria's Export Demand, Indian Journal of Aqricultural 
Economics, Vol. xxv, No. 1 (Jan-March 1970) pp. 59-73. 
6. Owosekun, A. A. (1980) "Prospects for Nigeria's Major Export 
commoditles. in the Expanded E. E. C.,, NISER University of 
Ibadan, 1980. 
7. Olayide, S. O. "Some Estimates of supply and Demand Elasticities 
for selected commodities in Nigeria's Foreign Trade, 
" 
The Journal of Business and Social Studies, ol. 1 
No. l,, Sept. 1968. 
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flexibility. He concluded that the hypothesis that 
exchange rate flexibility would solve the problem of 
external imbalance in Nigeria had to be rejected 
11 The empirical analysis shows that the price 
elasticities of demand for Nigerian exports and imports are qui e small and statistically 
insignificant. " 
His study covered the period 1955-1965. 
However, Osagie's study suffered from some 
limitations. Firstly, the estimation of price 
elasticities were complicated by distortions in the price 
of both imports and exports brought about by the 
imposition of import tariffs, quotas etc., which were not 
taken into account. Secondly, his data were only for a 
few years therefore providing few degrees of freedom. 
observers should therefore consider his conclusions in the 
light of the above limitations. 
Olayide and Olatunbosun in their study of "An 
econometric analysis of Nigeria's export demand" concluded 
that exports were not sensitive to prices during the 
period under study; therefore relative price changes 
cannot help Nigeria's foreign trade. The most serious 
problem experienced by them was the wrong sign exhibited 
by most of their price elasticities. Olayide and 
Olatunbosun, like Osagie, warned however, that in 
interpreting the statistical results, the appropriate 
8. Osagie, E. (1970), Op. cit. p. 12. 
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limitations like the few degrees of freedom and the 
"inability to specify, in a more detailed 
fashion, 
9 
the structural components of the export 
demand. " 
had to be taken into account. 
Quite apart from the above mentioned limitations 
which had given Osagie, Olayide and Olatunbosun 
studies little credibility, the fact still remains 
that Nigeria has undergone some structural changes 
since the 1960s. During the 1960s, the Nigerian 
economy was newly independent and to a very large 
degree an agrarian economy. Petroleum development 
was only in its infancy and exports were dominated by 
agricultural products which accounted for about 90 
percent of total exports. 
Now Nigeria has seen the most dramatic turnaround 
in her foreign trade sector. Agricultural exports 
have fallen, giving way to petroleum, which now 
accounts for about 95 percent of total exports. 
10 
ImportS, including food, have surged, due partly to a 
fall in domestic agricultural production, changing 
what used to be until the mid 1970s a balance of 
9. 
Olayide, S. O. and Olatunbosun op. cit. p. 69. 
10. This is by far the most important difference between the 
studies and the present one. 
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payments surplus into a deficit in the 1980s. " 
Bearing in mind these major changes in the structure 
of Nigeria's economy, we have undertaken a new study 
of the phenomena examined in the studies just 
referred to. In doing so we have tried to avoid the 
pitfalls of the earlier studies and to improve on 
them. 
8.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The scope and construction of a study of 
the foreign sector of the Nigerian economy depends on 
the answers to two questions: - 
First, which of the variables occuring in the main 
macro-economic structure are to be explained in the 
foreign sector study? Secondly, what are the policy 
problems to whose solutions the study is expected to 
contribute? 
With these in mind, the objective of the 
study is to investigate the determinants of the 
imports of Nigeria at the aggregate level and exports 
11. The Central Bank of Nigeria reported that for the first time 
since 1980, the current accounts balance of payments position 
improved, with external assets increased by 67.9 percent to about 
$1,700m. at the end of 1984, while the balance of trade surplus 
totalled $2,200m; West AfricanMagazine, 22 July 1985 No. 3543 
1503. 
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at both aggregated and disaggregated levels and to 
estimate the export and import demand functions 
during the period 1960-82. This will enable us reach 
the following conclusions: - 
1. whether or not relative prices have any 
significant impact on the Nigerian import and export 
f lows. 
whether or not the Marshall- Lerner condition 
for successful devaluation could be satisfied in the 
Nigerian case. 
The Marshall-Lerner condition stipulates 
that for a devaluation (revaluation) to improve 
(worsen) the trade balance, the sum of the 
elasticilies of the domestic import demand, T, and M 
the foreign demand for exports, n must exceed X 
unity: IT, + T11 >1 other things remaining the same. 
MX 
The Marshall- Lerner condition assumes that: - 1. the 
current account is initially balanced. 2. the 
elasticity of export supply is infinite. 3. the 
elasticity of supply for imports is infinite. 
4. the general level of prices remain constant 
between the countries and that changes in relative 
prices are the result of changes in the nominal 
exchange rate. 
5. trade is the only component of the balance of 
payments, that is, no capital mobility is involved. 
6. the exchange rate is determined by an 
administrative decision by the Central Bank rather 
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than by market forces. 
But is the Marshall-Lerner condition likely to hold 
in Nigeria 
Exports from Nigeria, as indeed most other developing 
countries, are predominantly raw materials and it has 
been argued that these kinds of exports face an 
inelastic demand curve. Therefore, the argument goes, 
a devaluation will not improve the balance of 
payments. 
However, the standard Marshall-Lerner condition 
argues that once 
ITI + Tl,. /. is satisfied, no matter the 
kind of economy, a devaluation would necessarily 
improve the balance of payments provided some of the 
above assumptions are met. 12 
To find out whether the Marshall-Lerner condition 
could be satisfied in the Nigerian case, we decided 
to estimate the import and export demand functions of 
the Nigerian foreign sector. The exports covered 
were petroleum, cocoa, palm kernel, rubber and 
groundnuts. 
8.3 THE SPECIFICATION OF THE EQUATIONS: - 
The approach used here is similar to that of Khan13 
12. Williamson, J. (1983) The Open Economy and the World Econonv 
Basic Books Inc. New York. 
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and Hauthakker and Magee. 14 
8.4 THE IMPORT DEMAND FUNCTION 
Imports are significantly related to 
domestic aggregate economic activity; they rise 
rapidly during booms and decline during recessions. 
The price of imported goods relative to domestic 
goods is likely to be also an important determinant 
of imports. The price of imported goods in foreign 
currency is taken to be exogenous to the system, 
which is probably quite true, because there is likely 
to be very little short-run relationship between 
movements of prices in Nigeria and prices abroad; 
except possibly for exogenous disturbances such as a 
world war. We therefore can relate the quantity of 
imports demanded by Nigeria to a ratio of Nigeria's 
import prices to her domestic prices (assuming that 
the goods involved could be substituted) and to the 
level of domestic real income. Expressed in terms of 
13. Khan,, M. S. (1974) ,I Import and Export Demand 
in Developing 
countries'IMF Staff Papers, November. 
14. Houthakker, H. S. and Magee, S. P. (1969) 'Income and price 
Elasticities in World Trade, $ Review of Economics and Statisti 
vol. 51,, May, pp. 111-125. 
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logarithms the equation can be written in linear form 
as; 
Log Mit=(x.. +a log ( 
epmi 
)t +a log Yit 01 PD. 
1 
ut ......... (8.1) 
Where 
Mi = quantity of Nigeria's imports 
PMi = Unit value of imports of Nigeria (world 
export unit values). 
e= Exchange rate. 
PDi = domestic consumer price index 
Yi = real gross domestic product of Nigeria 
The superscript d refers to demand, u is the error 
term, and t refers to time trends. The equation is 
specified in logarithms; therefore &1 and c< Z are the 
relative price and income elasticities of demand for 
imports with expected signs of 
ti 1 CL 
When estimating import and export 
equations, all sorts of problems arise and in the 
case of developing countries, the problems of 
misspecificatiOns abound. This is so because all too 
frequently no account is taken of quantitative 
restrictions placed on the movements of imports which 
might give rise to the elasticity estimates of a, 
and u? being biassed and inconsistent. 
15 In order to 
15. Khan, M. S. (1974) Op-cit p. 680- 
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take cognisance of this problem we introduce "the 
possibility of behaviour out of equilibrium by 
specifying a partial adjustment mechanism for imports 
in which the change in imports is related to the 
difference between the demand for imports in period 
t and actual imports in period t-111.16 
d A log Mit= Y[log Mi t-log Mit-1] ....... (8.2) 
I 
where A log Mit=Log Mit - log Mit-1 
This kind of adjustment mechanism means that the 
price of imported goods relative to the domestic 
price is taken to be exogenous to the importing 
country i. Another reason is that since the free 
flow of imports is generally distorted by contracts 
and licensing of imports, supply in most cases does 
not respond to increased demand immediately. 
If equation (8.1) is substituted into equation (8.2) 
and imports in period 
following results: 
Log Mit= ya + Y(I 1 
log ( 
t is solved for, we get the 
Lýpm + Yck 2 
log Yit + (1-y 
PD. 
1 
This brings to light the problems faced by Osagie and Olayide 
Olatunbosun. 
16. Ibid. p. 680 
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log m 
it-I 00000*0,0 
(8.3) 
where Ya I and YCx 2 are 
the short-run price and 
income elasticities respectively. For the 
equilibrium case, the demand function can be 
rewritten as 
109 Mit-.,., -- a0+U1 [109 PMit-log Pdit] +ýc 
)log 
Yit... (8.4) 
Similarly, equation (8.3) (the disequilibrium import 
equation) can be rewritten as; 
Log Mit= ya 
0+ 
yu 1 
[log PMi-Log Pdit]+ ya 2 
log Yit + (1--Y) 
log Mit-1 ............ (8.5) 
However, as mentioned earlier, because of 
quantitative restrictions that are common in 
developing countries, we thought that autocorrelation 
might be present. For this reason we decided to 
allow for autocorrelation in the error term. But it 
is important to point out that our indicator here is 
correct if and only if our assumption that simple 
equations (8.4) and (8.5) are the "true" equations is 
correct, and that the only misspecification is the 
restrictions which we do not know about. If the 
model is static, autocorrelation does not cause bias, 
only inefficiency. If the model is dynamic, then 
auto-correlation will cause bias and inconsistency. 
Therefore any adjustment for autocorrelation, no 
matter what was the cause, may improve the estimate. 
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We can then specify a first-order autoregressive 
process for the error terms in equation (8-4) and 
(8.5) as 
PU+F It 
YU 
t 
I Pli 
=1 
<1 
(P 
IýC-l E:, t) 
The errors are assumed to be normal and independent, 
with zero mean and constant variance, that is 
6 It - NID 
(o 
, (32 
The equations were estimated subject to these linear 
restrictions. 
8.5 THE EXPORT DEMAND EQUATIONS 
Exports are sometimes thought to be totally 
unrelated to other domestic activity, since they 
depend on income of other countries; however, this 
needs to be modified in two respects. First, exports 
(like imports) depend on relative prices, so that the 
price of domestic goods and serives produced for 
export relative to the price of other countries' 
goods (approximated here as the world price index) is 
an important variable in the export function. As in 
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the import demand equation, the export demand 
equation for Nigeria in an aggregate form could be 
specified in the following log-linear term; 
(I PX. Log Xlt =F>O+ ýjjog( 
PW 
I )i 2109 Wi + Ut **** (8.6) 
where, 
Xi= Export volume index of Nigeria 
Pxi = Nigeria's Export unit value index 
PW = World gross domestic product deflator index 
(a proxy for world price level). 
real world income index 
I and ý2 are 
the price and income elasticities 
respectively with the expected signs 
1<0; ß2 
>o 
Also just as we did for imports, we can test for 
incorrect specifications, which may result from 
estimating an equilibrium relationship when indeed 
the true relationship is in disequilibrium, "by 
specifying an adjustment function relating the change 
in exports to the difference between the demand for 
exports in period t and actual exports in the 
previous period (t_l)lll7 
17. Khan, M. S. (1974) Op. cit. p. 684. 
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log Xit = ý(jog Xd - 109 Xit-11 ........ (8.7) it 
O<X <1 
where ý is the coefficient of adjustment. This 
adjustment function assumes that Nigeria's export 
price is related to domestic activities and that the 
demand for exports depends on how competitive prices 
are internationally. By substituting equation (8.6) 
in equation (8.7) and solving for exports in period 
t, the following equation is arrived at 
PX. 
lag Xit = Äß 
0+ 
Äß, log ( PW 
')t+ ýß2 lag Wt + (1- ý) 
log Xit-1 +X Vt ................ (8.8) 
where Xý and Xý, are the short-run price and income 
elasticities, respectively. As was the case for the 
imports, equation (8.6) was rewritten as 
Log Xit + ý[log PXit - log PWtl+ ýlog Wt 
012 
vt ..................... 
We specified Nigeria's export supply as a log-linear 
function of the price of exports, the domestic price 
level, and domestic real income; 
Log Xit=bo +b I 
log PXit +b2 log PD 
Yit ............. 
b3 log 
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Khan specified what he called an export 
disequilibrium equation as; 
Log Xi Yýo + Yý11109 PX't-logpWtl+ Ya2 log Wt 
+ (1- Y log Xit-1 +Y Vt -0*00*0.00.0.. *a. (89 11 ) 
With the price of exports specified as adjusting to 
excess supply. 
8.6 DISAGGREGATED EXPORT DEMAND EQUATIONS 
In the same manner we can specify our Equilibrium 
disaggregated export equations as; 
PETROLEUM 
Log PETXit= Co +C1 [log Ppit-log Pwt]+ C, log Wt + V, 
.SSSSSSS5 (8.12) 
Similarly, the disequilibrium disaggregated export 
equations are specified as; 
PETROLEUM 
Log PETlt=Jo +JI [log PP -log Pwt]+ J, ) 
log Wt +(1- 
log PETXit-1 +y V2t******'****'*'* (8.13). 
and so on for other export products. 
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where 
PETX = Petroleum Exports 
pp = Price of Petroleum 
PW = World Prices 
World Income 
c estimated coefficients. V is the error term. 
Again as was the case of imports, there are 
quantitative restrictions placed on exports of 
primary products from developing countries by 
potential customers i. e. the industrial countries. 
Therefore, the role of these restrictions in the 
determination of exports was tested in the same 
manner as the restrictions on imports. This was done 
by specifying a first-order autoregressive process 
for the error terms in equation (8.6) to (8.10). 
Vt =P Vt-1 +wit i 
y Vt= Y(P I vt-l+Vt) 
<I and the Wils have the 
properties 
wl, NlD (0 1 CY2 
)IW NID ( 0, cr 
2)- 
12 -L 2 
8.7 METHODS OF ESTIMATION 
All the equations were estimated using two-stage 
least squares by means of instrumental variables. 
The instruments used were as provided by Khan. 
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Eq. (8-4) was estimated by using LPDi, LYi, LPW, and W 
Eq. (8.5) LPDi,, LYitj LpWt and LWi,, I-Mit-1 and LPMit-1 
Eq. (8-9)LPDi,, Lyit, LPWt and LW 
Eq. (8.11) LPDit, LYit, LPWt, LWt LXit-l and LPXit-1 
LPD, and LYlt may have been choosen by Khan because 
they are exogeneous to the export supply equation, 
while LPWt, LWit, and LPMit were choosen because they 
are exogeneous to the import demand equation. In the 
disaggregated equation, since only the export sector 
was disaggregated, we had to use LPD, LY, LPW and LW 
for each equilibrium equations. In the case of the 
disequilibrium equations we only had to place 
individual endogeneous variables in each case. 
Taking petroleum for example, we use the following 
LPD,, LY,, LPW, LW and LPETXt-1. In the case of cocoa 
we use LPD, LY, LPW, LW and LCoaxt-l and so forth. 
8.8 RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATIONS 
The aggregated import equations (8.4) and 
(8.5) and the aggregated export equations (8.9) and 
(8.11) were estimated. Similarly, disaggregated 
export equations were also estimated. The results of 
0 our estimation is presented in Table 8.2. For the 
following, discussions however, the equation with the 
lagged import and exports term (styled the 
disequilibrium estimates) will be concentrated upon 
because these allow time for adjustment in the long- 
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run reflecting what is known about habits in consumer 
behaviour and purchasing patterns of individuals and 
business men alike. Estimates and elasticities taken 
from the equilibrium equations are also presented. 
The t- statistic was used as a test of significance 
of individual coefficients. 
8.9 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS FOR NIGERIA 
As was stated earlier, our discussion here 
will focus on whether or not relative price changes 
can significantly influence trade flows in Nigeria 
and also to find out whether the Marshall-Lerner 
condition for successful devaluation is satisfied. 
In discussing this section, we shall make use of 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Table 8.2 presents the estimated 
coefficients with the standard errors in parentheses. 
The sample observations extend from 1960-82 periods. 
It can be seen from Table 8.2 that there is a 
considerable degree of variation in the coefficients 
-2 of determination (R But they also exhibit good 
2 degree of f, the lowest being Rubber with 68 
percent. Thus we could say that the independent 
variables account very well for the variation in the 
dependent variables. The evidence contained in Table 
8.2 suggests that relative prices are quite 
significant in determining changes in the volume of 
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8.3: - THE ESTIMATED PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES OF DE1,1AND 
DISEQUILIBRIUM TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARes ESTIMATES WITH 
LAGGED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
Short Run Lonq Run 
Total Imports 
Price -1.3 -1.7 
Income 1.2 1.4 
Total Exports 
Price -0.3 -1.1 
Income 1.1 4.3 
Disaqqreqated Exports 
Petroleum: - 
Price -0.5 -1.2 
Income 2.4 6.3 
Cocoa: - 
Price -o. 2 -0.4 
Income 0.3 0.7 
Rubber: - 
Price -0.4 -1.7 
Income 0.5 2.4 
Palm Kernel: - 
Price -0.4 -o. 5 
Income -5.8 -7.3 
Groundnuts: - 
Price -2.7 -3.6 
Income -0.4 -0.5 
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TABLE 8-4: THE ESTIMATED PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES 
EQUILIBRIUM TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES WITHOUT 
LAGGED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
Short Run 
Total Imports 
Price -0.9 
Income 0.8 
Total Export 
Price -0.2 
Income 3.0 
Disaggregated Exports 
Petroleum 
Price -0.9 
Income 4.0 
Cocoa 
Price -0.2 
Income -0.6 
Rubber 
Price -0.8 
Income -8.8 
Palm Kernel 
Price -0.5 
Income -4.2 
Groundnuts 
Price -3.3. 
Income -0.2 
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TABLE 8.5 : OVERALL CHANGE IN EXPORT VALUE OF 
NON-OIL SECTOR DUE TO DEVALUATION 
(N MILLION) 
CHANGE DUE TO 10% DEVALUATION: - 
SHORT RUN SITUATION 
1977 1978 1981 1982 
Exports (Non-oil) 
Over-all Imports 
Exports (Non-oil) 
Over-all Imports 
15.69 18.81 5.67 3.63 
1131.4 1203.8 1790.5 1763.4 
LONG-RUN SITUATION 
1977 1978 1981 1982 
57.53 68.97 20.79 13.31 
1479.5 1574.2 2341.4 2306.0 
CHANGE DUE TO 30% DEVALUATION 
1977 1978 1981 1982 
Exports(Non-oil) 47.1 56.4 17.1 10.9 
Over-all Imports 3394.2 3611.4 5371.5 5290.2 
imports and exports and that there are considerable 
possibilities of substitution between domestic and 
foreign sources of supply. Looking at the import and 
export elasticities, the Marshall-Lerner condition 
for successful devaluation is satisfied as presented 
in Table 8.3; but the elasticities are greater in the 
0 case of imports than exports. The long-run 
adjustments are also slower in export with -1.1 than 
imports with -1.7. The income elasticities are 
generally high in total iinports, total exports and 
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exceptionally high in petroleum exports as one would 
expect. A long run income elasticity of 6.3 is quite 
high for petroleum. Similarly, the income elasticity 
for cocoa is low in the short-run with 0.3 but slowly 
adjusting in the long run to 0.7. In the case of 
Rubber it adjusts from 0.5 in the short-run to a good 
2.4 in the longrun. Problems only exist in the cases 
of palm kernel and groundnut. 
These two products exhibit unexpected signs 
with -5.8 and -7.3 in the short run and long runs for 
palm kernel and -0.4 and -0.5 in the short and long 
run for groundnut respectively. 
The estimated price and income elasticities are 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level with the exception of the following; short run 
price elasticities for cocoa, plam kernel and short- 
run income elasticities for cocoa, and groundnuts. 
The aggregated export equation has pI and p2 of 0.730 
and 0.875. Petroleum has 0.751, Rubber has 0.443 and 
palm kernels 0.630 all with significantly higher than 
zero. For further results of significance tests see 
Table 8.2. As indicated at the bottom of Table 8.2, 
** represents figures significant at 5% 
level, * 
figures significant at 10% level while the rest are 
not significant at any levels. 
One possible reason for this high value of p 
in some 
of the equations nay be the quantitative restrictions 
frequently imposed in the export 
demands. It may 
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those cases. A possible reason for this failure could 
be due to misspecification of the model. The 
misspecification of a model may take one of many 
forms. For example, if one has specified a linear 
model when the 'true' relationship is non-linear, the 
residuals may signal the presence of autocorrelation 
and this is unlikely to be removed by the 
transformation and vice versa. The other case that 
arises frequently is when variables have been omitted 
and their impact is relegated to the errors in the 
model. If that happens, the equilibrium estimates 
with lower p is always preferred. The lagged imports 
value of 0.238 indicates that imports adjusts more 
rapidly than the exports with 0.748. 
8.10IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The term balance of payments is used by 
economists in two different ways. It could be used 
narrowly, to refer to the system of accounts which 
depicts a country's economic transactions with the 
outside world. It could also be used when economists 
wish to express the relationship between the 
effective demand for and supply of a country's 
currency. In this case, a country is referred to as 
being in balance of payments equilibrium when (in the 
absence of Government intervention, s) the amount of 
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Table 8.6 -- Adjusted Balance of Payments - Selected Years 
(Millions of Naira) 
SHORT RUN SITUATION (10% DEVALUATION) 
1977 1978 1981 1982 
Exports of Goods 8535.69 7207.81 10753.67 902-4.63 
Imports of Goods 7868.0 8056.2 11982-51 11801.3 
Balance 
Current 
on 
Account 
667.69 - 848.39 1228.84 - 2776.67 
LONG RUN SITUATION (10% DEVALUATIOo 
1977 1978 1981 1982 
Exports of Goods 8577.53 7257.97 10957.79 9034.31 
Imports of Goods 7223.49 7685.8 114'31.59 11258.7 
Balance on 1354.04 - 427.83 - 473.8 - 2224 39 Current Account . 
30% DEVALUATION - LONG RUN 
1977 1978 1981 1982 
Exports of Goods 8692.6 7396.0 10999.4 9061.0 
Imports of Goods 4264.5 4537.4 6748.77 6646.7 
Balance on 4428.1 2858.6 4250.63 2414.3 
Current Account 
Table 8.7 -- Estimated Current Account Position in 1983,1984 and 
1985 had Nigeria Devalued in 1982 
BY 10%: 
I rCI'TX4 A Trc 
1983 1984 1985 
Exports of Goods 9034.31 9049.1 
9065.5 
Imports of Goods 11258.7 
9344.72 7756.12 
Balance on - 2224.4 - 295.62 +1209.14 Current Account 
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its currency demanded at a given exchange rate is 
just equal to the supply coming on to the market. 
Similarly, it is referred to as being in deficit when 
the demand for its currency is less than supply, and 
in surplus when demand is greater than supply. 
Defined in this fashion, we can then refer to the 
balance of payments here as an analytical concept 
that could be used to examine such economic problem 
as exchange rate policy. We shall use it to analyse 
the implications for Nigeria of an eventual 
devaluation of the naira. If purchases of goods and 
services are sensitive to relative price changes 
which our regression results show that they are, a 
devaluation would encourage foreigners to buy from 
Nigeria and at the same time, discourage Nigerian 
residents from making payments abroad, whether in 
respect of visible or invisible transactions, 
However, much of this depends on the 
elasticity of demand conditions in Nigeria and the 
outside world. According to our regression results, 
a1 percent decrease in price will lead to a 1.1 
percent increase in total exports while a1 percent 
increase in price will lead to a 1.7 percent decrease 
in imports all in the long-run . 
In practical terms, using our balance of payments 
table (Table 8.1) ,a devaluation of 
10 percent would 
lead to some reduction in imports penetration of 
N835.0 million and mildly stimulate non-oil exports 
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by N15.7 million in the shortrun in 1977. The 
outcome is an improvement of the current account; 
turning what was a balance of payments deficit to a 
surplus of N667.7 million in 1977. It also reduced 
the amount of deficits in 1978,1981 and 1982 by 
N1222.61 N1607.2 and N1767 million respectively. In 
the long- run, the situation improved with a larger 
surplus in 1977 and a much reduced deficits in 1978, 
1981 and 1982. But with a 30 percent devaluation, 
the balance of payments position could be expected to 
improve considerably according to our studies(see 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6). Table 8.5 and 8.6 indicate 
that quantity exported would have actually increased 
and imports decreased if Nigeria were to devalue and 
that the increase in export is likely to be larger in 
the long-run than in the short-run. Table 8.6 and 
8.7 represent a J- curve for Nigeria's current 
account. The Tables indicate that if Nigeria had 
devalued in 1982 by 10%, in the period immediately 
following, she would have experienced a balance of 
payments deficit in 1983 and 1984. But these 
deficits would have been eliminated and the current 
account slowly moved back into surplus in 1985. 
However, this is subject to the following 
assumptions: 
1) That there will be a constant 10% reduction 
in 
the level of total imports from 1982 levels. 
2) That non-oil exports increase by 10% every year 
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from 1982 levels while all other exports like oil and 
NFS remain the same. 
Our results also indicate that for a quicker 
adjustment of the current account, Nigeria needs to 
devalue by about 30 percent or more. But the income 
elasticity of demand of less than 0.5 shown by cocoa 
in the short run could be a conclusion in line with a 
generalized version of Engel's law for crude 
foodstuff exports. Engel's law states that if prices 
and demographic variables (family size and 
composition) are held constant, a rise in income will 
lower the share of consumer expenditures spent on 
food and raw materials. 18 Palm Kernels and 
groundnuts both exhibit negative signs in their 
income values. A possible reason for this may be 
that some oil seed alternatives may have been found 
for these products which our analysis did not take 
into account. But according to our analysis, in spite 
of Engel's law widely associated with most primary 
exports, a devaluation would improve Nigeria's 
balance of payments position albeit in the long run. 
At least Nigeria can draw some confort from Ghana, 
whose economy is reported to be responding well to 
the IMF-induced reform programme. The Ghana 
18. Elkan, W. (1973) An introduction to Development-Economics, 
Penquin Books Ltd., p-47- 
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Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, Kwesi 
Botchwey, disclosed that the GDP rose by 7.6 percent 
in 1984, thereby reversing 5 consecutive years of 
decline in the real per capita income. Inflation was 
reduced from 123 percent in 1983 to 40 percent in 
1984 while agricultural production recorded an 
impressive 10 percent increase919 In the Nigerian 
case,, for revenue to rise, agricultural output has to 
increase and more exported. This is not bad for 
Nigeria because it will mean high growth in the 
agricultural sector, which is having a difficult time 
at the moment, and will mean increased employment in 
that sector too. Oil is priced in U. S dollars and is 
therefore not affected by the devaluation of the 
naira. But a devaluation of the naira increases the 
government's naira revenue from oil exports, much of 
which is spent by the states and local authorities. 
This argument, Rimmer (1985) succintly put when he 
stated; 
11 ....... A 60 percent 
devaluation 
against the U. S dollar would raise 
the naira equivalent of a dollar by 150 
percent. The naira equivalent of the oil earnings 
of 1984 (for example) would have be 5n about 
N20 billion instead of N8 billion. " 
0 
-------------------- 
19.1 Economic Sun Shining in Ghana again 
United Bank for Africa (UBA) Monthly Businessand Econo7l_, - 
Digest Vol. 8 No. 5, May 1985 p. 8. 
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If we assume that the gap between supply and demand of 
traded foodstuffs like maize, rice, wheat and palm oil are 
bridged by increased imports, a devaluation will not only 
result in Nigeria looking inwards as imports become more 
expensive and therefore increase domestic production to 
bridge these gaps, but may equally result in Nigeria 
actually exporting these products. In this case, a 
devaluation may bring about the export of a wider range of 
goods; with the response greater in products with a 
shorter gestation period like maize. A realistic exchange 
rate would enhance the export of products like rice with 
high domestic labour cost content. Similarly, although 
evidence suggests that the aggregate demand for 
agricultural exports in a given export market in the world 
as a whole might be fairly inelastic, but if the 
depreciating country supplies only a small proportion of 
that commodity in the world market as is the case with 
Nigerian cocoa, rubber, palm oil and kernels, the 
elasticities of demand for these products will be higher. 
The importing countries will buy less from the other major 
producing countries and more from Nigeria. The quantity 
demanded for groundnuts, of which Nigeria used to be a 
major world supplier may not improve very much, but at 
20. Rimmer, D; (1985) 'The overvalued currency and over- 
administered Economy of Nigeria; African Affairs, 
V01.84No. 336 
July. 
147 
least Nigeria will resume exports again after a long 
stoppage. In the case of cocoa, Nigeria will probably 
gain from depreciation at the expense of say the Ivory 
Coast and Ghana who are major suppliers. Following a 
devaluation of the naira, the total world imports of cocoa 
may not rise very much, if at all, but Nigeria's share in 
providing cocoa might increase considerably. Accordingly, 
in estimating the effects of devaluation, sufficient time 
should be allowed for adjustments to take place. 
Our conclusion therefore is that since relative prices do 
influence trade flows in Nigeria, as was evident in our 
analysis, and the Marshall-Lerner Condition for successful 
devaluation is satisfied, Nigeria may not be worse off if 
she were to devalue contrary to the fears of most 
commentators. 21 However, we quite appreciate that, 
depending on the percentage of devaluation, the volume of 
exports and imports respond only slowly to the change in 
relative prices that the devaluation may engender, 
therefore imports remain high and exports low in the 
immediate post-devaluation period. Time is needed for full 
adjustment. our empirical analysis shows that with 10 
percent devaluation it probably will take Nigeria four to 
five years to correct a balance of payments deficit to a 
surplus while with a 30 percent devaluation it may take 
about two years. Our strongest case for a devaluation 
is 
21. See Osagle (1970), and Olayide and olatunbosun (1970). 
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its effects on import reduction in the medium and long 
term. While a devaluation may help Nigeria recover, 
equally important are other recovery programmes like 
improved producer prices for agriculture and cautious 
monetary policies. 
8.11 SUPPLY-SIDE ASSUMPTIONS 
The above demand-side analysis is based on the following 
supply-side assumptions: 
1. It is assumed that the government would respond to the 
above criticisms by increasing producer prices and 
dismantle some of the institutional bottlenecks that have 
for so long inhibited agricultural production. 
2. That farmers themselves would respond to the above 
policy reforms (i. e. increased producer prices) and 
increases in demand due to devaluation by making use of 
excess capacity available such as fertile land and rural 
labour. Farmers can switch from domestic to export crops. 
This assumption is not unreasonable because empirical 
evidence in Nigeria and indeed other developing countries 
has shown that export volumes can actually increase 
following a devaluation and/or higher producer prices. 
Oni (1969)22 set out to investigate the effect of the 
22. Oni, S. A. (1969) Production response in Nigerian agriculture 
case study of palm produce 1949-1966, Nigerian Journal of 
Economic and Social Studies, March. 
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Marketing Board price-fixing Policies on the level of 
production of palm produce in Nigeria. His hypothesis was 
that the supply of palm produce would respond positively 
to an increase in producer prices. Oni postulated two 
models, one for palm oil and the other for palm kernels. 
The general structure of the two models is the same; the 
only difference lies in pertinent independent variables 
affecting the production decisions for either palm kernel 
or palm oil. For palm oil production, the factors selected 
"a priori" as the pertinent independent variables 
affecting production decisions are actual producer prices 
of palm oil, world price index for oil seeds, acreages of 
oil palm in production, a weather variable, and a time 
trend variable representing changes in technology. 
A standard multiple regression model in which the 
quantity of palm oil purchased by the Marketing Board23 is 
the dependent variable and the independent variables are 
those mentioned above was constructed and the final 
mathematical model utilized was implicitly represented as 
f ollows: 
Log Y 
ot 
=a0+aI Log P ot 
+a2 Log P St +a3 Log W t-2 
a4 Log At+a5 ............ 
(8.14) 
where 
Y 
Ot 
= the amount of palm oil purchased in year t 
23. Onl., S. A. used Marketing Board purchases as a proxy for tot 
production figures. 
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Ot = 
Actual producer price of palm oil in year 
World price index for oil seeds in year St - 
At Acreages of oil palm in production in year t 
w 
t-2 
Weather index for year t 
Time trend measured in years. 
The model for palm kernel was constructed on the same 
basis as that of palm oil and the final equation utilized 
written in implicit form as follows : 
Log Y kt = ao +aI Log P kt +a2 Log P st 
+a3 Log At 
a4 Log W t-2 
+a5T.............. 
where 
kt ý- 
the amount of palm kernels purchased in year 
P kt ý 
Actual producer price for palm kernel in year 
t and w 
t-2 
and T are the same as in palm oil model in 
equation 8.14. 
The analysis was done first for the Eastern Nigeria only 
and later extended to the whole federation. The computed 
elasticity coefficient between producer prices of palm oil 
and aggregate level of palm oil production for the former 
Eastern Nigeria in equation 8.14 is 0.7. This means that, 
with the effect of other independent variables remaining 
constant at their sample mean values, an increase of one 
percent in producer price for palm oil by the Marketing 
Board was associated with 0.7 percent increase 
in the 
aggregate level of palm oil pro0ution 
in the Eastern 
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States and 0.4 percent in the entire Federation. For palm 
kernel, it was 0.4 percent for the Eastern Nigeria and 0.3 
percent in the entire Federation. The absolute values of 
the coefficients of the elasticity as computed from the 
various equations for producer prices for palm oil and 
palm kernel are less than unity. However, the calculated 
elasticity of acreage response is in every instance 
greater than unity. The signs of the elasticity 
coefficients conform with "a priori" knowledge. 
Oni finally concluded that the results of the regression 
analyses indicate that oil palm farmers react positively 
to increases in producer prices of palm produce. Whilst 
the weather index is found to be a significant factor 
affecting aggregate production, the net relationship 
between time and time squared variables and aggregate 
production was positive and negative respectively, 
suggesting the declining influence of technology over the 
period studied. Oni also concluded that even though the 
calculated elasticities for both palm oil and palm kernel 
indicated an inelastic relationship for the supply of 
these commodities over the period studied, supply still 
responded to increased prices. 
24 
In a study conducted by Bhagwat and Onitsuka 
(1974) 
-------------------- 
24. Bhacjwat, A. and onitsuka, Y. (1974), Export-inport responses 
: exv ý Of the non-industrial countries 
in th 
1960slr IMF Staff Papers, July. 
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of post-devaluation export performance in a number of non- 
industrial countries, it emerged that in the majority of 
cases export earnings and volumes did grow following 
devaluation. Where little or no expansion in exports 
resulted, or where a decline occurred, special 
circumstances were usually found to exist. They also found 
that for the more developed non-industrial countries which 
exported agricultural goods with shorter gestation 
periods, minerals or manufactured goods, the supply 
response of exports to devaluation appears to be somewhat 
greater. This is consistent with our argument on above 
which says that following a devaluation, exports in 
Nigeria may be greater in products like maize with a 
shorter gestation period. In another study by DeWilde 
(1980)25about supply response to an increase in producer 
prices in Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana, he observed that 
producers can switch from one crop to another depending on 
price incentives. DeWilde stated that; 
11 The rapid adoption of cotton cultivation in 
Sukuma-Land seems to have been considerably 
stimulated during the 1940s and early 1950s 
by a rising trend in buying prices. Changes 
in the rate of adoption of tobacco as a cash 
crop also appear to have been influenced by 
25. De-Wilde, J. C. (1980), Agricultural Development 
in Africa, (ed) 
by Robert H. Bates, and Micheal F. Lofchie. 
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prices., j26 
DeWilde observed that for the price incentive to achieve 
its purpose (i. e. increase production), farmers must see 
it as a permanent and enduring incentive rather than a 
temporary aberration. 
3. In view of the fact that changes in agricultural 
production are not, of course, solely attributable to 
price changes, manpower availability and increased demand 
for output, but also result from changes in the weather or 
from the need to bring less fertile land into cultivation 
because population is increasing, we have therefore, for 
the purpose of our analysis, assumed that these variables 
are constant. This is not an unreasonable assumption, 
since apart from the weather these other factors affect 
output only very gradually. Even the weather in Nigeria 
can be largely ignored for our purposes since Nigeria has 
largely escaped the terrible droughts that have in recent 
years afflicted other parts of Africa. 
Only parts of Northern Nigeria has experienced rainfall 
shortages, but the North has never contributed more than 
marginally to Nigeria's agricultural exports, except 
for 
groundnuts. 
26. De-Wilde, J. C. (1980) p. 126. 
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12 
PAYMENTS :A POLICY OF DOMESTIC DEFLATION. 
devaluation accompanied by pressures on 
OF 
domestic demand via increased money supply would only make 
Nigeria's balance of payment position worse. To avoid this 
kind of situation happening, Nigeria requires an effective 
demand management policy such as a deflation of the 
domestic economy. 
Deflation of the domestic economy has three effects on the 
balance of payments, relating to relative prices, imports 
and exports. First, a deflation will reduce the relative 
rate of increase of costs and prices for Nigerian goods 
and services. The magnitude and length of the domestic 
deflation will depend upon the time required for the costs 
and prices of foreign goods to rise and restore Nigeria's 
competitive position by re-establishing relative equality 
between domestic and world prices. Secondly, through its 
effects on the level of domestic income, a deflation will 
reduce imports. Thirdly and most importantly, a deflation 
will release goods and resources from supplying the 
domestic market and so permit a short-run expansion of 
exports. 
The argument is that in a period of peak domestic demand, 
goods and resources which would otherwise be used to 
supply export markets will be diverted to domestic sales. 
In these circumstances, it is argued that government 
domestic deflationary measures ( for exmple, credit 
155 
squeezes, tax increases, wage restraint, cuts in public 
0 expenditure ) will release goods and resources from 
supplying the home market so allowing firms to increase 
their exports. At the same time, it is maintained that a 
domestic deflation will encourage firms to seek overseas 
outlets for the products which can no longer be sold at 
home. In other words, a deflation predicts an inverse or 
negative relationship between the pressure of domestic 
demand, on the one hand, and short-run variations in 
export performance, on the other : high pressures of 
domestic demand will reduce exports below their trend 
value and vice versa. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
Until the early 19701s, agriculture has been the cornerstone 
of the Nigerian economy. Not only has agriculture provided 
over 97 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange by way of 
exports of agricultural produce, but the expansion of the 
non-agricultural sector has strongly relied on domestic 
agriculture for both sustained increase in the domestic 
supply of food and for raw materials used in manufacturing of 
all kinds of products. Agriculture was also seen as the 
principal source of capital for investment elsewhere in the 
economy. Thus the development process involved the transfer 
of a surplus from the agricultural sector to the other 
sectors. The coming on stream of oil in Nigeria has had 
serious effects on the economy. These effects have made 
themselves felt in two ways: first via increased government 
revenue from oil and secondly, via the Dutch disease 
syndrome. But this study has largely concentrated on the 
second part of these effects. Since 1970, oil exports have 
dominated Nigeria's economic development, and have brought 
about several fundamental changes in the economy. Table 6.6 
gives data on the composition of exports in recent times. 
Although total export earnings have risen rapidly over the 
past two decades, the expansion has been almost entirely due 
to the rise in oil exports. Of the earlier exports, only 
cocoa and cocoa products and palm kernels have registered 
sustained increases, but this was rather on account of price 
rises than an increase in volume as Table 6.6 shows. 
All 
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other exports declined in volume except petroleum. 
Groundnuts, groundnut oil, palm oil and cotton exports all 
disappeared completely from 1974. To get the best deal out of 
the oil sector, Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleun 
Exporting Countries in July 1971 and therefore benefited fron, 
the concerted action of OPEC members in 1973 to push oil 
prices up. In 1973, oil prices quadrupled. As a result, there 
was a very large increase in oil revenues, both in the sense 
of export earnings and of government revenues. 
Secondly, the oil export boom brought with it a trail 
of negative impacts that retarded growth in other part of the 
economy, particularly agriculture. The phenomenon has been 
termed the Dutch disease. The term Dutch disease was coined 
from the observed impact of North Sea gas production on the 
Dutch economy. With increased export revenues from gas, the 
guilder appreciated against other currencies, making Dutch 
exports of manufactures uncompetitive internationally, and 
causing export to decline and increasing unemployment. I 
Dutch disease' manifests itself in three ways; first, the oil 
export creates an expanding surplus in the external account, 
which pushes up the exchange rate. As the exchange rate 
appreciates in real terms, the non-oil sector is squeezed. 
Secondly, we have the spending effect; the expansion of the 
oil sector increases domestic spending on non-tradeables 
(i. e. construction, transport services, trading, etc. 
). This 
increased spending raises the price of non-tradeables 
in the 
short run, which also induces a real appreciation of 
the 
domestic currency the real exchange rate, 
( defined as the 
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nominal price of foreign currency deflated by an index of 
domestic cost) falls. Although the oil revenue is also spent 
in the lagging sector, which includes agricultural exports, 
import-competing food production, and manufacturing import 
substitutes,, it does not lead to a rise in prices of 
tradeables whose prices are controlled by the government and 
are determined in the world market. Excess demand for 
tradeables, generated by lower prices, is therefore met 
through additional imports enhanced by high exchange rate. As 
prices rise in both the non-tradeables and oil sectors, 
labour is drawn from the lagging sector (Agriculture) into 
the non-tradeables and oil sectors thereby, causing a decline 
in output of the lagging sector. Similarly, when the increase 
in prices of the oil and non-tradeable sectors raise the 
marginal product of labour in these sectors, it causes labour 
to move from the lagging sector into the oil and non- 
.1 tra-'ý--ble sectors. Therefore, both the spending and resource 
movement effects pull labour out of the lagging sector. This 
movement of labour out of the lagging sector into the booming 
sectors and the squeezing of agriculture due to the 
appreciation of currency, Cordon called the I'de- 
agriculturalization". 
However, while currency appreciation, the spending and 
resource movement effects all have played crucial 
roles in 
agricultural decline, they are not the only 
factors 
responsible. Other factors like 
the low prices paid to local 
farmers by the Marketing Boards and other government 
agencies 
have also contributed to the 
decline. The government, on the 
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other hand encouraged unrealistic increases in demand through 
the use of consumer price subsidies. With big increases in 
demand in the wake of a decline in domestic production 
combined with a high exchange rate, imports of cheap food 
flooded the domestic market. Nigerians in the city had 
acquired a taste for rice, a food much tastier and easier to 
prepare than the traditional yam or cassava. The rise in the 
value of the currency meant a falling price in naira terms of 
imported rice. For a fairly long time, Nigeria has been able 
to pay for these imports with the oil money. But since early 
1982, oil has faced a difficult time in the world market, so 
much so that the revenue accruing from oil is now almost one- 
half of what it used to be in 1979/80. In 1984 for example, 
oil revenue was N7 billion while in 1980 it was N14 billion. 
But until quite recently the earlier high exchange rate was 
maintained so that the naira became substantially overvalued. 
As oil revenues continued to fall, Nigeria plunged herslf 
into a serious balance of payments problem which necessitated 
her going to the IMF for a loan of $2.0 billion in 1983. One 
of the conditions prescribed by the IMF was that Nigeria 
should devalue her currency. In view of this, we decided to 
investigate empirically the implication of a devaluation of 
the naira on the Nigerian foreign sector. The empirical 
analysis was conducted with the following objectives: 
1. To investigate whether or not relative price changes 
do 
have a significant influence on the 
iinport and export flows 
in the Nigerian f1reign sector. 
2. To investigate whether or not the 
Marshall-Lerner 
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conditions for successful 
devaluation could be satisfied in 
the Nigerian case. 
our results, suggest that both conditions are met and 
that the devaluation of naira would improve the Nigerian 
balance of payments. There is strong evidence to suggest that 
a successfull devaluation could redeem Nigeria from being a 
mono export economy. This study also acknowledges that a 
devaluation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
quick agricultural recovery. Given the extent of the oil 
shock on the economy, other measures like improved producer 
prices or the dismantling of the marketing boards system may 
help a quick recovery. 
161 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Attiga, A. A. (1981) 'Economic Development of oil producing 
countries, ' OPEC Bulleti 
,. t_-tln- Nov. 
Atkinson, F. and Hall, S. (1983) Oil and the British 
Economy, 
_ 
Croom Helm, London and Canberra. 
Anyadike, N. (1985) 'Nigeria -A future without oil I West 
Africa Magazine, 26, August p. 1745. 
Barker, T. and Brailovsky, V. (eds) (1981) Oil or 
Industry? Academic Press. 
Bates, R. H. (1985) Markets and States in Tropical Africa, 
University of Cal. Press. 
Bauer, P. T (1964) West African Trade, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
Bhagwat, A. and Onitsuka, Y. (1974), Export-import response to 
devaluation: experience of the non- 
industrial countries in the 1960'sL IMF Staff Papers, July. 
Babcock and Wilcox, (1975), Steam: Its generation and use. 
Corden, W. M. and Neary, J. P. (1982) 'Booming Sector and De- 
industrialisation in a small Open Economy, ' 
Economic Journal, 92 Dec. 
Corden, W. M, (1984) 'Booming Sector and Dutch disease; 
Economic Survey and consolidation, ' Oxford Economic 
Pal: )ers--- 36,359-380. 
Cleaver, K. M. (1985) 'The Impact of price and Exchange Rate 
policies on Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, 
' 
World Bank staffworkinq Paper No. 728. 
Concord weekly Magazine, 17 oct. 1985. 
162 
concord weekly Magazine, 6 May, 1985. 
Danielsen, A. L. (1982) The Evolution Of OPEC Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich Inc. 
DeWilde, J. C. (1980), Agr elopment in Africa 
R. H. Bates and M. F. Lofchie. 
at ed. by 
Elkan, W. (1973) An Introduction I-n PTTý112pme Lnt-Economics 
Penquin Books Ltd. 
Edwards, S. and Aoki, M. (1983) Oil Export Boom and the Dutch 
disease, Resource and Enerav Vol. 5 219-242. 
Economic Intelligence Unit (1984) The World 
Financial Times, Nov. 29,1982. 
Fesharaki, F. and Isaak, D. T. (1986) Opec, the Gulf, and the Wor'l-, 
petroleum market, p-43. 
Harberger, A. C. (1983) 'Dutch disease - How much sickness, 
how much boon? Resource and Energy 5 pp-1-20. 
Houthakker, H. S. and Magee, S. P (1969) 'Income and price 
Elasticities in World Trade, Review of 
Economics and statistics, vol. 51 (May) pp. 111-125. 
International Monetary Fund (1975), International. 
Financial Statistics August, Washington D. C 
International Financial Statistics, year book, 
1985. 
Khan, M. S. (1974) 'Import and Export demand indeveloping 
countries I IMF Staff PaPýlr-s (November) - 
Nigerian, National Petroleum Corporation . 
(1981) NAPE-T-C-O-R-. L- 
vol. 2 No. 1 Jan. -Mar. 
The Tide Newspaper-, L Saturday 
April 7,1984 p-5. 
annual e Tningq__qgRýýýý11960 
163 
1961. 
annual reports of the Petroleum Division of +. -'-. e 
Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources. 
Central Bank of, Economic and Financial Review. 
Neary. J. P. and Wijnbergen, S-V. (eds) (1986) Natural 
Resources and the Macroeconomy (Basilblackwell). 
News watch Nov. 25,1985. 
Osagle, E. (1970), Price Elasticities in Nigerian foreiqn 
trade and Exhange rate flexibility. Nigerian 
Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), 
University of Ibadan. 
Olayide, S. O. and Olatunbosun, D. (1970) 'An Econometric 
Analysis of Nigeria's Export Demand, ' Indian 
Journal of Aqricultural Economics, vol. XXV, No. 1 
(Jan. -Mar. ) pp. 59-73. 
Owosekun, A. A. (1980) 'Prospects for Nigeria's Major 
Export Commodities in the Expanded E. E. Cl NISER, 
University of Ibadan. 
Olayide, S. O. (1968) 'Some Estimates of supply and demand 
Elasticity for selected commodities in Nigeria's 
Foreign Trade, Journal of Business and Social 
Studies, vol-1 No. 1 (September). 
Onoh, J. K. (1983) _ 
oil EcgngMy., L. Croom Helm, 
London & Canb. 
oni, s. A. (1969), Production response 
in Nigerian agriculture: a c 
study of Palm produce 1949-1966, 
nal of 
Economic and s--jn1 c--tudies, March. 
Petroleum I 'eekly (PIW)Nov. 
6. 
164 
Rimmer, D. (1985) 'The overvalued currency and over 
-administered Economy of Nigeria, ' African kffa rs, 
vol. 84 No. 336 July. 
Rimmer,, D. (1984) The Economies of West Africa, 
International Economies Series. 
Roemer, M. (1983) Dutch disease in developing countries: Swallc-,: 
bitter -medicine; Harvard Institute for 
International Development, Oct-p. 21. 
Shell-BP (1962) 'Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria,, Training for Industry in Niqeria. 
(1966) Shell BP schools Programme. 
(1965) Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria The Shell BP Story, Port Harcourt (May). 
Stevens, C. (1982) Nigeria: Economic Prospects to 1985; 
After the oil glut, Economic Intelligence Unit 
(E. I. U. ) Special Reports No. 123. 
Sampson, A. (1985), The Seven Sisters; The great oil 
companies and the World theV made, (Coronet 
Books) - 
Schatzl, L. H. (1969), Petroleum in Nigeria (Oxford 
University Press) Ibadan. 
Times, of London, (1974) March 4. 
Usen,, A. (1985) 'Food Supply Continues to lag far 
behind 
nations's requirements lNewswatch, 
Nov. 25. 
United Bank for Africa (1985) 'Economic Sunshining 
in 
Ghana again' Monthl 
d Economic Diqest 
165 
vol. 8 No-5 (May) p. 8. 
(1985) Monthly Business & Economic Digest vol. 8 
No -1 and 2 Jan/Feb. 
- (1985) Monthly Business & Ec)no nic Diqest, V01.8 No-6 
june - 
Verleger Jr. P. K. (1982) Oil Markets in Turmoil, Ballinger 
publishing Co. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
u7ni 1 qt--reet Journal.,. _ 
Dece. 13,1973. 
World Bank (1974) World Bank country econonic Reports: 
Nigeria options for lonq-Term Development. 
(1985-86) World Debt Tables. 
Wijnbergen, S. V. (1984) 'The Dutch disease: A disease 
after all. ' Economic Journal, 94 March, 41-55. 
West Africa maqaZýýIne 22 July 1985 No. 3543 p. 1503. 
Williamson, J. (1983) The Open Economy and the World 
Economy, Basic Books Inc. New York. 
166 
U) 
cn 
,ýý, 0 
cz 
H 
C) 
CO 
H 
CD 
I) 
1" 
C 
I. -'. 
c 
CD 
0 
H 
CD 
z 
CD 
IV 
H M tz : 3: cl, cn 1 7- - t1lo 0 C: 0 (ID 1 1 x c c rt (D 0 
1 10 fln N; 1ý .V ý co C, 
-P- , 
a- Un -P- cc ýlc 
rr 
r, PI C 
N) r? c cn rr C 
. P- 
w 0-- N) rl; N) ýn 0 - 'IN E 1- , rr = C- pl- U) \Z 00 Lrl W C: ý13 N ý-- r- (0,1% --1 0 -ýj 00 U-1 k-P r1i C- () 
Ul oo Ul ý_; l a' W C- 
rt 
"TJ r- 2: '014 
0 
C) 
' * ' ý, ý, ;: ) ý-- -j ý-- ýý % 
c %ý r-r 911 0 
H. = rT 
0 
NJ c 
Cý r1i -r_- - NJ r-j 
rl; 4- c ZI; C-1 
00 Ln C\ 
CD --j CD c --j U-1 r? 
o 
P. -- r-r o tT: 
--i CD O'\ Ln ý. c \ýc c Ln C; I\ 01 
Ul co N; :3 
ý. ý :;. (D 0 -ý 
:; - C-' X"0 r"i W ON r-, 0 ý- C-' 
n C: 
Lo -r-- (ON LA; 
Li c 
Cý- -., U- ý- 0 CL ý- " Lri 11C C) rýj 
LO 
P--.; 
LTI ý- :: I -ý -- ý-- ý-- ON 
cc 
oo 
0 C- 
cc C- 
n 
(L 
167 
Appendin. Tablp 3.1 --- Joint Venture Participation Interests of the Nigerian Government in the Exploratory and Exploitation Sector 
of the Oil Industry 
COMPANY PARTICIPATION DATE ACQUIRED NO. OF LICENCES 
ELF 35 1/4/71 4 
35 1/4/74 4 
60 1/7/79 4 
AGIP/PHILLIPS 3 3_1 3 1/4/71 4 
55 1/4/74 4 
60 1/8/79 4 
SHELL/BP 35 1/4/73 58 
55 1/4/74 58 
60 1/7/79 58 
80 1/8/79 58 
GULF 35 1/4/73 10 
55 1/4/74 16 
60 1/7/79 16 
TEXACO 55 1/5/75 6 
60 1/7/79 6 
MOBIL 35 1/4/73 4 
55 1/4/74 4 
60 1/7/79 4 
PAN OCEAN 55 1/1/78 1 
60 1/1/79 1 
ASHLAND b Not applicable June 1973 
2 
NOTES: a. Equity participation 
b. NNPC/Ashland arrangement is a production sharing agreement. 
SOURCE: NAPETCOR, quarterly magazine of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, Vol. 2, No. 1, January-March, 
1981. 
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A"pFppndix Tablp 4.2 -- Oil Revenue ContribUt4on to Goverment Revenue 
YEAR TOTAL REVENUE OIL REVENUE PERCENTAGE OF OIL 
TO TOTAL REVENUE 
1958 154.6 0.2 0.08 
1959 177.6 3.4 1.01 
1960 223.6 3.0 1.01 
1961 229.7 2.4 7.46 
1962 231.6 17.1 7.30 
1963 249.2 17.0 4.05 
1964 299.1 15.1 5.38 
1965 321.9 18.0 9.07 
1966 339.2 30.0 13.27 
1967 300.2 45.0 13.96 
1968 300.0 42.0 13.53 
1969 435.9 80.0 17.30 
1970 755.6 219.1 29.0 
1971 1,410.9 635.0 44.16 
1972 1,379-9 752.6 54.5 
1973 2,156.2 1,461.0 67.8 
1974 5,159.4 4,184.3 81.1 
1975 5,832.6 4,613.6 79.1 
1976 7,042.7 5,493.3 78.0 
1977 8,070.0 5,971.8 74.0 
1978 6,362.7 4,282.1 67.3 
1979 13,805.7 11,362.0 82.3 
1980 15,815.6 13,221.8 83.6 
1981 12,476.0 11,340.7 90.9 
1982 11,016.0 9,815.3 89.1 
1983 9,306.8 7,620.4 81.9 
1984 11,331.7 7,797.0 68.8 
SOURCE: (1) 1958-1981 figures were obtained from: NNPC, Petroleum 
Economics and its Impact on National Plans; Document 
produced by the Economic Research Unit 1982 (unpublished). 
(2) 1982-1984 figures were obtained from: Central Bank of 
Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, several issues. 
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Appendix: Table 4.4 -- Nigeria - Oil Industry Production and 
Expenditure on Goods and Services (1938-1974) 
Year Imports of 
Goodand 
Services 
(Nm) 
(1) 
Local Exp- 
enditure 
on Goods & 
Services 
(Nm) 
(2) 
Total 
Expendi- 
ture 
(Nm) 
(3) 
(2) 
(3) X 100 
(4) 
Oil Produrtion 
(ý24T) a 
(5) 
1938-62 120.2 81.4 201.6 40.4 n 
1963 21.2 19.6 40.8 48.0 n 
1964 48.0 27.0 75.0 36.0 n 
1965 71.4 46.4 117.8 39.4 4 
1966 116.0 66.6 182.6 36.5 22 
1967 98.0 58.4 156.4 37.3 17 
1968 72.2 25.0 101.2 24.7 8 
1969 121.6 57.8 179.4 32.2 29 
1970 133.6 96.8 230.4 42.0 57 
1971 164.2 113.2 277.4 40.8 81 
1972 184.3 129.6 313.9 41.3 93 
1973 252.1 121.7 373.8 32.6 109 
1974 305.5 105.1 410.6 25.6 119 
NOTES: 
SOURCES: 
(a) MMT = Million Metric Tons 
(b) n= negligible 
Columns (l)-(3) for 1938-1974: CBN: Annual Reports, 
various years 
Column (3) for 1977; NNPC Annual Report, (1977). 
Column (5) same as text Table 4.5. 
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Appendix Table 4.6 -- Employment in Nigerian Oil Industry 1960-1977 
Categories 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
TOTAL : Nigerians 2896 2601 2422 2391 2751 2798 3085 
i. Management 
ii. Supervisory & 104 130 160 170 185 226 242 professional 
iii. Skilled workers 
iv. Unskilled workers 
2792 2471 2262 2221 2566 2572 2843 
V. Others 
TOTAL : Expatriates 416 348 314 335 324 337 353 
i. Management I 
ii. Supervisory & 
professional 
iii. Skilled tech- 
416 348 314 335 324 337 353 
nicians 
iv. Others 
GRAND TOTAL 3312 2949 2736 2726 3075 3135 3438 
Cate, agories 0 1967 1968 1969 1970 1972 1974 1976 
TOTAL : Nigerians 3252 2261 3567 3578 3886 4686 5621 
i. Management 16 8 24 24 24 33 63 
ii. Supervisory & 
professional 606 283 543 634 992 1304 1887 
iii. Skilled workers 1043 750 1178 1182 2158 2621 3158 
iv. Unskilled workers 969 734 1026 1220 649 622 487 
v. Others 618 486 796 518 63 106 26 
TOTAL : Expatriates 640, 627 825 583 658 583 482 
i. Management 47 61 74 97 8"' 65 79 
ii. Supervisory & 
professional 564 556 736 466 358 517 402 
iii. Skilled 
technicians 38 1 15 20 212 - - 
iv. Others - 9 - - 6 1 1 
GRAND TOTAL 3901 2888 4392 4161 4544 5269 6103 
SOURCE: Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company for Nigerians in Management, 
Supervisory and Professional and Skilled workers and expatriates 
1960-1966; Annual Eý_por. ýs of Petroleum Division of the Federal 
Ministry of Mines and Power, Lagos; Data supplied by the Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources and the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corportation Publication. 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA SOURCES 
Import quantity Index= Value of imports in nominal Terms 
World export unit value index 
value of imports figures were obtained from the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, several 
issues. World export unit value index was obtained from 
the IMF International Financial Statistical Yearbook 1984. 
Export quantity Index= Value of exports in nominal Terms 
Nigeria's Export unit value index 
The value of all exports were obtained from the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, several 
issues, while the figures for Nigeria' Export unit value 
index were obtained from IMF International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook, 1984. 
The export prices for the disaggregated agricultural 
commodities were obtained from the World Bank; Commodity 
Trade and Price Trends, August 1981 and figures adjusted 
to 1977=100. 
The volume of petroleum exports were obtained from the 
International Financial Statistical Yearbook 1984 while 
the petroleum export prices 1960-1974 were obtained from 
the Oil Economists' Handbook by G. Jenkins and 1975-82 
quoted by Shell-BP Statistical Review of World Enerqy, 
June 1984. 
The World Income: The world income figures 
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(percentage increases) were obtained from the IMF 
International Financial Statistical Yearbook 1984 p. 120. 
The Exchanqe Rate figures; naira per U. S. dollar annual 
averages were obtained from the World Table Vol. 1 Edition 
3 supplied by the Economists Intelligence Unit. 
Consumer price Index: - The Nigeria consumer price (or 
retail price) index 1960-64 was obtained from the U. N. 
Statistical Yearbook 1964 p. 524, quoted by Osagie. 1965- 
69 from the Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and 
Financial Review Vol. 10, No. 2 Dec. 1972, p. 4.1970-82 
from the World Trade Vol. 1 edition 3 supplied by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 
World Price Indices: - These are prices reported 
by the organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Paris. 
The Niqerian real Gross Domestic Product: - Nigeria's real 
Gross domestic product at factor cost, 1960,1965 and 
1970-82 were obtained from the World Table vol. 1 E ition 
3, while the intervening years were calculated from 
figures provided by the Federal Office of Statistics, 
Lagos - 
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